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The Economlc and trlnanclal Situatlon in Luxembourg
PART I
THE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SITUATION
IN LUXEMBOARG
(). INTRODUCTION
Luxembourg has outperformed the economies of other
Member States and in particular those of its neighbour
cormtries formore than a decade. Good growthperformance
and a steady increase in employment have been accom-
plished with modest inflation. The rate of unernployment is
l.60/o andby far the lowest in the Commr:nity. The deficit on
the visible trade balance is exceeded for by an important
srphs on the services balance and the current accourt conti-
nues in surplus. The government budget showed a modest
deficit in 1991 after eight corsecutive years ofsurplus and
the gross public debUGDP ratio is only around 3%. Luxem-
bourg fulfills all five EMU convergence criteria and short-
term prospects seem to be better than forany otherMember
States.
This good overall performance was accomplished in spite c,f
a Community-wide decline, since the middle of the 70s, of
the steel indusfy, once the counf5l's major source of value
added. The Luxembourg steel industry, however, had begun
restructuring as early as 1974. Further restructuring at the
beginning of the eighties was zupported by effective govem-
ment (and Community) intervention measures. From the
sixties already, a more general policy for encouraging indus-
hial diversification has been pursued. Private investrnent in
sectors other than steel has been encouraged by a mixture of
direct financial incentives and a policy of flexibility provi-
ding generally favourable business conditions.
Besides industrial diversification, there was also the impres-
sive rise in financial services, particularly enhanced by
liberal banking laws and tax provisions. However, the autho-
rities have been well aware of the risk involved if the
economy were again to become too dependent on one single
branch of economic activity and they continue to advance
investment in other industry sectors. All in all, it appears that
a strong basis lor further economic growth has been estab-
lished.
Graph 1: Relatlve performance of Luxembourg
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The Economlc end Flnanclal Situetlon ln Lurembourg
I. MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
AND PROSPECTS
Good economlc performance
Between 1980 and l99l outprtr increased by an average of
t.4Yo pr yar and from I 986 to I 99 I annual growth of GDP
was even 4.ff/0. Employment grew by 2.0% per year be-
tween 1980 and l99l W3.6% from 1986 to l99l). Unern-
ployment peaked in 1983 at a level as low as 3.5% of the
labonr force and is cunently l.6Vo,by far the lowest in the
Community. Prospects for 1992 and 1993 are also better than
in most other Member States. After a buoyant 1989 with a
6.9/orise in domestio product, grounh slowed somewbat in
1990, but in l99l economio activity accelerated ag6in. In
spite of a considerable slowing of grourth in neighbouring
counries, total orsput is expectedto increase by tbo$2.T/o
rn1992and2.ff/oin 1993.
Ttroughout the period 1980 to 1991 private consumption
has been an important source of growth in demand" In l99l
private consumption was boosted by a sipificant reduction
of income taxes. Private inrastnent has been showing con-
siderable fluctuations, which is not srrprising given the
limited size of the oconomy. In the las few years buoyant
private inveshnent, both in equipment and constnrctioq has
boosted domestic demand. The ratio oftotal gross fixed capi-
tal formation to GDP amounts now !o more than 25o/o, co*
siderably more than in the surrounding counties or other
Member States.
This remarkable growth performance was accomplished
with relatively modest inflation The early eig[tties saw price
rises ofup to lff/o per year, and average inflation for the
whole period 1980 to l99l is S.2P/o,bnl after 1985 the pace
of price rises eased. Between 1986 and l99l umual inllation
was I point higher than in Germany, 0.5 point more than in
Belgium and a little lower than the Frpnch inflation ra!e. In
1982 the system whereby wages were indexed according to
inflation was zuspended and pay rises were very modest for
a few years. In 1984 uage indexation was reestablished,
however, and in variors wage rounds the "losses" which oc-
cr:rred in the previous years were gradually made up for.
Wages have increased considerably in the last fav yean and
further uprmrd wage presslre is one of the ftw possible me-
dium-term risk factors, particularly if shortages were to
occur in the supply of labour. In the light of the modest size
of the economy, Luxembourg has linked its money to the
Belgian franc and has no independent monetary poliry of its
owIL
This overall picture of good performance should be r.nder-
stood agairxt the background of Luxembourg's size and lo-
cation. Economic outprt is 0.1% oftotal EC outpa. Withort
the sizable inflows of cross-frontier worlcers (relatively im-
portant, but modest in absolute numbers) this continuous
shong growth of production and unployment together with
low unemployment and modest inflation would have been
inconceivable. Resident and non-resident foreign labour rep
resent 45olo ofall jobs. Non-residentworkers account fortwo
thirds of the observed rise in employment in the last few
years and now represent more than 20Yo of total ernploy-
ment.
Since 1986 the level ofGDP per head ofthe population has
been the highest in the Communif and it continues to in-
crease more rapidly than in other Member States. Productiv-
ity growth, expressed as the growth of total ouput (GDP) per
person employed" is one ofthe few areas where there are in-
dications of a less favourable development. Between 1986
and l99l productivity increased by les than l% per year,
which is, along with the Netherlands, the lowest productivity
growth in the Comrnunity. At the same time GDP per person
employed increased by I .6%o pa year in the Cormnunity as a
whole. Some qualiffig remarks should be made here, how-
ever. First, the logic ofthe national accounts definitions im-
plies that the contribution of the banking sector to the
econuny is rnderestimated in the case of Luxembourg. In a
nurnber of cases GNP might be a better measure for output
than GDP (see box on page l0). Second, the incidence of
part-time work has increased. Third the high strare of cross-
frontier workers blurs the interpretation of the GDP per
capita figure. While contributing to GDP;cross-frontier
workers are not accormted for in the population figure, the
demominator in the GDP per head ratio.
Graph 2: Employment
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The Monetary Assoclaflon wlth Betglum
One of the particular feahres of the Luxernbourg economy is the monetary association with Belgirmr which has existed
since 1922. Since the second world war, the monetary association has never been questioned except in 1982, wtren the
Belgian franc was devalued. The fact that the Belgian franc in addition to the Luxernbourg franc is legal tender in
Lruembourg has some implications wtrich are both interesting by themselves and in the wider context of Er:ropean
Econornic and Monetary Union.
First of all, Lrxembourg cannot conduct an independent monetary policy. The creation of Luxunbor:rg francs by the
Luembourg Monotary Institute is limit€d by regulation in order not to jeopardize liquidity rnanagement in the mon-
etary union by the National Bank of Belgiuru The range of policy inshuments at the disposal of the Luxernbourg
Monetary Institrxe is limited to direct credit control. This possibility has never been used.
Second, the Belgian and Lrxembourg money markets are unified, as are the foreign exchange markets. Becawe of the
special position of Luxernbourg as an intemational financial centre, its banks play an important role in the money
market and Luxenrbourg is a substantial contihsor to the balance of paymurts of the union. The Luxembotrg banla
typically have a net position in the money market reflecting the reinvesbnent of Belgian deposits attracted by fiscal
considerations. The liquid position of the Luxemborrg banks does not appear to have crealed particular difficrdties for
the conduct of monetary policy in the union as a wtrole, wtrich is explained by the fact that the Belgian Luxernbourg
Economic Union is a price-taker anyhow in credit and goods markes and that for a large part these deposits are rein-
wstedinBelgium.
While it appear-s that Lrxembourg's financial centre has not created particular difficulties for monetary poliry in the
rmioq this seerns less so for its neighbours, to the extent that cross border holdings of deposis could obscure the
relation betrveen the national definition ofthe monetary supply and ultimate targets. The explanation for this differen-
tial impact can be attributed to the price-taking behaviour cf the Belgian-Luxunbourg Economic Union while some of
Luxembourg's neighbours dispose of a certain degree of freedom to formulate an independent money zupply target,
wtrose realisation could be affected by ooss-border holdings of deposits. To the extent that the latter problem exists,
Luxembourg does not seem to be the cause ofit (see chapter 2 ofPart II).
Finally, to the extent that separate monetary indicators exist for Lrxernboug (for example : the money srpply or loug-
t€rm interest rates), they are not relevant for the monetary stance of Luxembourg which largely imports its monetary
conditions. They seem to be more relevant for the situation of the association as a whole or of the larger parhrer. LFR
long-term interest rates, for example, carmot be used to construct a leld curve in order to say something on inflationary
expectations in Luembourg. They appear in conjunction with ttrc evolution of long-term BFR rates more informative
on the evaluation by marlcets of the Belgian economic situation (see chapter 2 of Part II) although attention should be
paid to the relative absence ofthe Luxemborrg Govemment in domestic capital market when comparing interest rates.
Can the experience with the monetary association between Belgirm and Luxernbor.ng, wtrich cu be judged positive
based on its survival for so many 1cars, be extrapolated to the project of monetary union at the European level? A
transposition is difficult, especially because of the big difference in size between the two countries involved, making
the Lu,rembourg economy heavily dependent on factor mobility and an obviors candidate for forming a monetary
rnion, according to the Optimum Cunency Area Theory. Hence, the cost for Lruernbourg of losing the monetary pol-
icy insruments is minimal. This can be illustrated by the low degree of real exchange rate variability which exists
between Belgium and Luxembourg, suggesting that strocla affect both economies in a similar uay. The standard devi-
ation ofthe real exchange rate (based on yearly data on rmit labour coss betwe€m l97l and l99l) is 5 between Belgium
and Luxembourg while it is 6.1 between Luxanboug and the Netherlands, 6.9 between Luxernbourg and France and
7.2 beturcen Luxemboug and Germany.
Nevertheless, some concluions can be drawn from the Belgian-Luxernbourg experience. The advantage of the associ-
ation in terrrs oftansactions cosls and in the stability ofthe rate are clear. Its existence oraer such a long period suggess
that the monetary association has not impeded the economic development of both parhers and in particular that the
impossibility of conducting an independent monetary policy by Luxunbourg was not a drawback. Furthermore, it il-
lustrates that asymmetric shocls are a thrcat to a monetary rniorl even if;, as in the case of the Belgian Luxunbourg
Economic Unioq the smaller region is e)dremely open to the larger. The deterioration of the competitive position of
the union during the seventies affected Belgium much more than Luxembourg also becaue of divergent policy re-
spotses : a fiscal expansion to compeosats for increased unernploymart in Belgirrn and stnrctural measures to encou-
age the development of the intemational banking sector in Luxembourg. Hence, Luxanbourg seerned to have needed
less the derrahution of 1982 for budgetary or economic reasoqs. Indee4 breqking ttrc monetary assocation between the
two countries would have had sigrrificint costs, be'iarse of the openess ofthe smaller region to the larger. In addition,
the Luxerrbourg banks, having a large net position in Belgian francs, would haVe inoned severe losses in case of a
revaluation of the LER vis-i-vis the BFR with possibly important consequences for the economy given the relative size
of the banking sector.
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Since the decline in the steel industry in the seventies, the
tade balance has bee,n in deficit. The intemal dynamisn of
the last few years spuned imports and a cyclical fall in prices
and demand on the steel market depressed exports. The
deficit in visibles has been rising and was LFR 60 billion in
1991. Given the current wealness of the international steel
market and the continuing strength of domestic demand the
fade deficitrnay increase firther. The surphs onthe servicps
balance, an imporAnt part of whictr is from capital earnings
from abroad" is about twicB the size ofthe goods deficit and
the cunent account surplus is sorne 2flo of GDP. In additio4
exports of services - air transport telecornnnnications and
audiovisual services are growing.
A healthy publlc flnence sltuatlon
With the exception of the years 1980 and l98l ttre govern-
ment budget was in surplu for more than two decades. The
public debUGDP ratio is around 3%, the loncst in the Com-
munity. Taking into account the variors investment funds
that exist, the net debt of the central government is actrully
negative. Although the total burden of taxation has gradnlly
been decreased from 58% in 1985 to its current 5270, it is still
among the highest in the Community. h January l99l direct
taxes were srbstantially reduced and the tax s)6tem simpli-
fied. The top income-ta( rate was brouglt doum fiom 56% to
50% and other tax rates reduced accordingly and tax pro-
gfesivity was mitigated. The tax decreases led to a central
government deficit of LFR 8.0 billion (2.0% of GDP) in
l99l which could rise to LFR l5 billion in1992. The exist-
ence of accrrmulated reserves allows, however, for a con-
tinuors neptive bonowing requirement.
Graph 3: Publtc flnence
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With a view to harmonizing taxes in ihe integrated market
VAI rates and excise duties are being increased in a two step
exercise. On lst January 1992 the higher VAI rate was raised
to 15% (from the previous lz%).Tbe overall increase in in-
direct taxation (and prices) is more modest however, than
this rise would suggest. For a nunber of items VAI rates
were actually reduced as they were shifted to lower rate ca-
tegories. In order to limit the effect of tax harmonization on
cross-border shopping the same approach is taken for excise
dutieg which are adapted progressively since 1.1.1992 and
in 1993 will attain the minimum levels agreed on the Euro-
pean level. Some easing of the underlying inflation rate
seems appareot u,hich should facilitate the accommodation
of these measures by the economy. Total annual tax revqlu€
strould ircrease by abou LFR 4 billion; the crrnulated rry-
war{pressure on inflation in this two-year period should not
be more ttran 0.8 percentage points.
The contibrlion from the gorremment budget to social se-
curity provisions is as high as 4V/o and this "fiscalization"
shows a rcndency to increase. Legislation has been voted
which envisages curbing the gradual "fiscalization" of
health care financing. The share in GDP of transfers to
hotseholds declined for a number ofyears after it pealced at
26.3% n I 98 I . It is now rising again an d at 23.T/o of GDP in
l99l it is secmd only to the Netherlands and several points
higher than ir5 for instarrce, France andBelgunn O$lays re-
lated to pensions are particularly generous and becoming in-
oeasingly costly. Given the ageing of the population the
persion s)6tern appears to need revision in the longer term;
either contibutions need to be raised or paynrents lonrered.
2. INDUSTRIALDIVERSIFICATIONAND
REGIONAL INFLUENCE
Before the EC wide crisis in the srcel industry, the Luxem-
bourg arttrorities had recognized the risks involved with the
economy's over-dependemce on the steel industry. Firstly, the
cplical morrements in ttre world steel market implied major
fluctuations in u economy with over 3(P/o of its GDP com-
ing from this branch of induSry; secondly, it uas felt that
both a slowing of long-term denrand for steel on world mar-
kets and increased competition from newly industializing
countries were to put constraints on the sector's long-term
growttr potential. With a vial to steering and accommodat-
ing the structural changes that were considered nooessaq/,
the govemmemt embarked, therefore, on a poliry for indus-
tial diversification This policy approach is pursued at pres-
ent within a context of regional cooperation.
Strong growth in splte of e dbcllne tn the steet tndusEy
The good overall performance in the eighties is, remarkable
since it uas accomplistrcd during a period of a Community-
wide decline and important resmchring of the steel indus-
try once the country's major source of value added.
Resfucnring began as early as 1974, honurcr, when other
producers in Europe were still expanding their production
capacities. kt 1974, employment in the Luxenrbourg steel
seclor peaked at 28 000, but in 1980 it had already fallen to
l8 000. Furtherreshucturing and capacity cuts were requir€d
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at the beginning of the eighties. Between l98l and 1990 the
steel sector's sture in GDR which was still 29% in 1970, fell
further frun l2o/o to 7 .5o/o and its share in total employmant
decreased from ll% to under 5%.
Graph 4: Indushld shocture 7c shares ln value
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Rationalization and capacity cuts at the beginning of the
eighties were supported by an overall government "Steel
Plan" and subsequently by Community-wide measures
within the European Coal and Steel Community framework.
Sigrrificant stat€ aids were given and the govemment took a
3T/oputicipation in the capital of the major steel company.
With the support of laborr representatives redundant steel-
workers were tsed in the realization of public works instead
of being laid off. With a view to balance the budget, the costs
concerned were not to be financed from bonowing and a
'tolidarity tax" was imposed involving a l0% rise in direct
and indirect taxesl, wtrich was latier reduced to 5% and then
to its actual2.5%.
Pollcy of lndusElal dlverslllcatlon
Investment is encouraged by providing direct financial in-
centives and, on the other hand, by a strengthening of zup-
ply-side factors.
Since 1962, the furancial incentives system has been pro-
gressively evolving in time. Its main elements involve capi-
tal grants towards investnent costs (including investment in
non-tangibles), interest rebates, loans and the provision ofin-
dustrial sites and buildings. Partial tax exernptions for pro-
jects during the development phase may be granted for new
companies and new products. For the audiovisual industry
'tnvestment certificates" were created, which €mtitle inves-
tors to tax deductions. The sitrution as regards industrial pol-
icy provisions is relatively open and transparent. Subsidies to
the manufactr:ring indrsry are lower than in the EC on aver-
age. Nevertheless, specific factors like the diqproportionally
high cost ofthe public transport system, because ofthe small
size of the country, account for somewhat distorted overall
high subsidy figures.
A draft is now pending which is to adapt national indwtrial
policy provisions in line to new EC regulation. This implies
that investment activities, in order to be eligible for state
aids, strould serve regional policy aims, environmental pur-
poses, the enhancement of research and development acti-
vities. In addition, investnent incentives will continue to be
available for the SME's. The Luxembourg authorities stress
their [aditionally highly selective approach to new invest-
ment projects and related requests for financial support.
They do not, therefore, expect this regulatory change to have
much effect on their industrial policy practice.
Generally favourable supply factors and the flexible and re-
sponsive regulation by the Luxembotrg authorities may
have been of as much importance as the specific set of
measures more commonly labelled'tndustrial poliqy''. Lux-
embourg's greater autonomy compared with other'tegions"
of its size may have given it a comparative advantage in this
respect.
Among the more general supply side factors accormting for
the appeal Luxembourg has for investors, the authorities
stress the high level of education, the linguistic skills of the
population and" firthermore, the reliability and quality ofthe
labour force. Another factor that needs mention in this con-
text is the climate of social peace and stability Otat has been
achieved by a continuous effort of consersus building be-
tween governrnent, employers and labour. Another point par-
ticularly stressed by the Luxembourg authorities in
connection with the general business climate relates to their
cautious public finance policy. This policy sterns from the
view that an economy this size cannot afford to run deficits
or to lnve a debt problem without risking the loss of inves-
tors'confidence. A particular "scale advantage" concems the
accessibility of high officials up to minister level and the
possibility that licences and permissions can be delivered
rapidly.
The chernical industry (mainly rubber and plastics process-
ing) is the most noticeable among the'heu/'manufac'turing
activities. Today this sector accounts for 5000 jobs, about
l4%o of total industrial employment. Other'heu/' manufac-
hring activities concem, for instance, non ferrous metal pro-
ducts, machinery construction and glass. In a period of
barely two decades the Luxemboug economy has gone
through a process of very rapid'tertiarization". Between
1970 and l99l the total share of manufacturing in GDP (in-
cluding the steel sector) fell from 45Yo to 24%o; tu;t of the
I [r the aftermath of ttre 1973 oil strock many gonernments raised both their spending and, as taxes were not increased
accordingly, tbeir bonowing. The Luxembourg government also expanded its spending exc€ptionally rapidly, but
adapted taxes accordingly and the budget continued in surplus until 1980.
(2)
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senrioes sector expanded from 4lo/eto 650/o.The indusEial
policy has airned at prwenting the scissor effect by develo-
ping new manufacturing iodtrstries.
The ernergence of the financial sector fomrs a very visibte
sucoess ofthe approach taken since the early 1960's, but
various other service industries rapidly expanded as well.
Exanples are the air tansport indusry and, more reently,
telecommunications and medias. Notwithstanding this
strong growth in tbe teniary sector, output in non-steel
manufacturing has also developed favourably with growth
rates of4 to 5% a )rear throughor, the eighties; therefore, its
sbare in (the strmgly gowing) GDP has remaired a steady
16%. Total emplolment inaon-stoel manufacturinghas been
rising again tom 1984 and emplolment growlh has been
partiorlarly fast in ttte laS fewyears.
A speclllc labourmrrket sltuedon
Resident and non-resident foreigp labor.r represents about
45%o of total employment (5P26 of employees) andTV/o of
new jobs are accounted for by non-resident forcip norkers.
These high perc€otage figrres repres€nt modest numbers in
absoh.te terms, however. The daily inflow of ooss-frontier
workers involves about 42 000 jobs in all. The surrotnding
r€gons have, so far, had little difficulty in coping with this
sitnation and wage lwels there arp still sore 30plo to SV/o
lonrer than in Luxeoborg Tinavelling distarces for the in-
creasing nunbers of daily cotrrmutors from Belgiu4 Ger-
many and France are probably no grealer than the distances
usully tavelled by worters to any other major city or rc-
gional centre in Europe. These flows of workers, although
snicrly spealcing an international phenomenoq should rather
be interpreted as the progressiw integration ofregional la-
born marke6. European integratim will further unphasize
this (inter) regional perspective. Oertain international as-
pects arc, rrcvertheless, involved relating to tatation and the
provision of public goods, e.g. edrstion and training, and
the financing of social security. According to calculations by
the Lrurernbourg authcities, tar( rev€orE might fall by ap
proxirnately 5% ofbudget roceipts wero the principle applied
thattax is paid in the country ofresidence, as proposed bythe
Cornmission.
After several years of strongly rising employmenl shortages
art now becoming apparent for certain categories of laborr.
Consraints may oocur evql on sryply in this "extended' la-
bour market in the long term and this could lead to upward
pressure on wages. A continrution of the qrrent situation
might also involve greater political fridions. Futhermorc,
land prices have gom up coruiderably and the physical avai-
lability ofland - a negative scale factor - is another potential
constraint on firture &velopment.
Pollcy lssues end prospectr
In spite of the possible futue constrainB referred to, the
policies for encouraging a diversified patt€m ofinvestrnent
are being furttrer pursued. tking account of the current la-
bour marftet situatior and the age stsucturs ofthe population,
these are aimed at activities with high value-added per per-
son. Wth a view to improving the infrastnrcture, the sbare of
public investment in GDP has grafually beeo increased to
4%. Priority is giventothe furttrer developme,nt ofhighways,
telecmrmrmications facilities and health and old age infra-
structures. The ar[horities have also offered to co-finance a
high speed train track in France from which the cormtry
would benefit The adtrorities also continue to lay stress m
education and training. Recently a training institute, at
uiwrsity level, for the banking sector has been established.
A cooperation arrangement has been establistred with the
sunouding rcgions with a view to joint adivities in the area
of industrial development and promotion and to provide a
frameuro* for avoiding bottle-necks.
The approach taken by tbe Luxe,mboug government has so
far be€n effective and successful in ensuring a strong basis
for economic growlh. Several questions can be raise4 never-
theless. They concern l) the extent to which government
measures may have distorted the working of market forces;
2) whether the policy of zubsidies represents an optimal rse
of Luembourg tax revenues and 3) ttrc policy approach to
be taken in future. The two latter points are accurhuted by
the increasingly strained situation in the labour market and
by the high level of taxation in Luxembourg. In this context,
it has been suggested that tax resourpes now used for subsi-
dizing industries might find higher returns in portfolio in-
vestment abroad.
The following points deserve consideration in this context.
Firstly, the rationalization and capacity cuts in the steel in-
dustry in the early eiglrties clearly required sigrificant gov-
ernrnent intervention measnres. During that period, given 0re
predomftunce of the steel in&lstry, state aids as a percentage
of GDP to the manufacturing sector were higher than the EC
a\rerage. From 1986, however, they have been lower. There-
fore, in spite ofthe emphasis the authorities put on industrial
policy, actual policy measures are possibly not much at vari-
ance with the approach taken by other govemments. Sec-
ondly, the policies punued (and the results accomplished)
should be seen in a regional context. Although they may
seem urusual in comparison with other Member States (es-
pecially the explicit emphasis they receive), they are less
shiking if compared with the approach taken by other re-
gional authorities. The growth performance, wtrich also ap-
pears exceptional in a nation-by-nation comparison is les
rmcornmon if compared with developnrcnts in other regions
performing well. h additiorq it could be argued that without
these policies - and givur the size of the econorny and the
decline of the steel industry Luxembourg might now not
have been a botm ar€a-
Considerations of competition policy and possible supply
constraints lead to questions about the future policy ap-
proacb. For the time being, one has to conclude that the crn-
rent policy has been successful. The effort to strengthen
cross-frontier regional coordination and cooperation may
provide an opportrmity for avoiding possible future bottle-
necks and frictions and enhancing the efficient use of re-
soursss. Furthermore, the adaptation of national law while
maintaining the principal policy irstnrnents particularly for
rcgional development will emphasiz investment of SME's.
The Economlc utd Flnenclal Sttuetlon ln Lurembourg
3. IMPORTANCE AND STRUCTURE OF
TIIE FINANCHL SECTOR
Lu:rembourg's financial oenhe is ooe of the largest in Europe
and unique in its international orienation In 1990, the finan-
cial sector accounted for l5o/o of GDP and 8Plo of employ-
ment; this is, in int€rnational terms, a very higlt figue. In
absolute termg honer€r, Lrxe,mbourg is not more important
lhnn a medium-sized Ernopean financial centre. It is clearly
b€hind Frankfirt, Paris or, ofcourse, London and also lacks
the complete line of financial sen ices which they offer.
Luxembourg rather ttun serving tho raried needs of a large
dunestic eioonony for financial serrrices, as is the case for
most other European centreg has esablished itself in certain
niche markets for Europe as a ufiole.
Its derrelopment started around 30 years ago as a location for
the Eurocunency buiness in view of tighter regulation in
other cormtsies (in particular the US withholding ta:( and
German aliaiglrrm reserve requirements). Today around
170 foreign banks operate in the market and deal mainly
with clients frorn ttreirrespective horrc cotrnhies. Apart from
regulatory advantages of the Euromarkets, falling hansac-
tions and telecommuications co$s atso supported the cre-
ation of Luxembourg's Eurocurrency markets. Today,
Luambor.ng comprises l0-l l% of the total European Euro-
currency btsiness, behind london (40% share) and Paris
(rSYr).
After the take-off of the Euroorrencymarkets, the Eurobond
buiness came next in buildiqg the Luxenrbourg financial
centre. The seventies and eigbties saw a strarp increase in in-
temational capital flows and the rise in sectnities as a major
mears of financing. Luxembotrg managed to reap consider-
able benefits from these developments with an attractive
liberal framework and tbe presence of different institutions
operating in this field (the Exctrange responsible for listing
urd tading, the CEDEL for the settling the EIB as issrer).
Luxembourg gained in the past mainly from the considerable
activity in dollar bonds, but morp recently the emergence of
the privale ECU as a top cunsncy in the intemational mar-
kets is giving another boost. There exists no natural home
market for the ECU, while, for other orrencies, the home
rnarket is the main competitor. In contrast to the Euroqr-
rency markets, however, the Eurobond market failed !o at-
tract brsiness in DIvt as the German Bundesbank is trying to
keep this business based in Germany.
A ttrird major martet for Luxembourg was built on m$ual
funds, especially after the EC regulatory liberalization in
1985 (and its early implementation in Luemboug) of cer-
tain types of mutul funds. The number and total asset size of
frnds registered in Luxembourg sk5nocketed in rececrt years
urd now contibutes sigrificantly to ovenll activity. At the
end of 1991, a total ofLFR 4.100 billion net asset value
(elevur times ttrc l99l GDP) uas rpcorded.
Other markets and lesser services, srrch as private hnking,
stock trading or re-insurance, are of importarrce corpared to
the above-mentioned markets; some of them, however, have
just started to play a role in the county and are growing
rapidly.
Luxembourg's financial markets have gmdually become
more broadly based with an increasing strare of services r€-
quiring high-quality labour input. Yet, Luembourg remains
a c€ntre wtrich is different from other European cenEes, be-
carse it is :
- 
rather qpecialized in a few finarcial services (srnall role in
stock trading insurance, invesEnent banking, or other ser-
vices suctr as auditing legal seMces.);
- 
serving a mainly intemational clientele, (less ttun 15% of
bank deposits are held by domestic clients) and the "export
ratio" in other areas is gernerally eve'n higher;
- 
a comparatively yormg, financial market place. Just a for
decades ago it began from almost rero; its high flexibility
and innovative sEength at least partly stems from this fact;'
old taditions do not slow down further development;
Table l:Financial Sector : The Business Stucture
Importence for lVorldwlde Shere Future Dynamlcs Maln (erport"
Lurembourg markets
targe Iarge Low-medium D, F
Merket
Eurocurrency
Merket
Eurobond
- 
tredlng
- 
lssulng
- 
clearing
- 
llstlng
Prlvate banklng
Mutual funds
Relnsurance
Stock-tredlng
Medium
Medium-hish
Medium-hiEh
Low-mediritr
4B,USA
USA
Maln Competltors
London,
NewYork
London
London, Paris
Brussels
London
Medium
Larse
IarEe
Metium
Iarge
Medium
Verylow
Very large
Iarge
Verylarge
Still low
Verylow
High
Hish
Hish
D, F, NL, B Switzerland,
Channel Islands
Bahamas
Jersey, Dublin
LIK Scandinavia, F Bermuda, Cayman
Islands, Switiuland
NL London
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- 
exposed to internatioml competition to a far higher degree
than other European cities. This creates more risk but also
an aborre-average poteotial for finttrer deraeloprnent.
The lnternetlond porltlon
Luxernbourg as a financial centre is a major player on the in-
ternational market. Operating without a sizeable home mar-
ket, Luxembourg was forced from the start to offer its
services to foreip clients. To be strccessful in doing so im.
plied that the country had to offer some clear advantages
over other financial centes. Part ofthese advant4ges, but
definitely not all, are of a regulatory natue.
Lruernbourg's intemational pmition varies largely accord-
ing to the markets considered. In the Eurocurrency busirpss
it has a rather strong position(|tr/o ofthe European Eurocu-
rency brsines is canied ots in Luxenrbourg). This sture is
larger in the continental cunencies srch as Dlvr, FF and SF.
Luxembourg is weaker in the Eurodollar and the Euroster-
ling market. The most important competitor by far is, of
course, the City of Londoq which dominates the markets.
Luxunbourg lacls the breadth in its banking community to
aspire to a significantly larger stnre of brsiness. Rattrer it
will have to make efforts to keep iC strong position in DM
and FF, as more and more continental c€nbes arc competing
seriously.
Lrxunbourg's intemational standing is more pronourrced in
certain services linked to the Eurobond business. Exchange
listing is predominately dorrc on the Luxernbourg exciange,
and CEDEL (Cenrale de liraaison de valeurs mobiliCres),
the Luxembourg-based settlement firm shares the martet
only with Euroclear in Brussels. This dominarrce is striking
in the field of EC-denominated bonds. Ofnarly issued ECU
bonds in l99l7l% were listed solely in Lrurunbourg an-
olhEr 60/o also in Luxembourg. The country's popularity as a
place for marlcet listing is larger for bonds with sruller total
issue volume.
The role of ttre bond madcet in domestic currency is unique.
Here also the position as a major European financial hub can
be seen. In 1991, less than 8% of the new bond volume was
issued by domestic borrowers; Belgian and French bor-
rou,ers were mos't heavily urgaged in this market. The phe-
nonrenon of the bond market underlines and reinforces the
international position of Lu:ambourg.
Reguledon end supervlslon
A strict regrrne ofregulation and supervision has been essen-
tial for the take offof the financial sector. When comparing
Luxembourg's regime with other countries, one cannot
idemtiff a great number of differences and reliefs in Luxem-
bourg. It offen only a few advantages, which are carefully
desigted however, for the deraelopment of certain important
market segrnents. It was not only the use of a few incentives
in tax and regulatioq but also the credible attitude and long-
term view of the Luxembourg authorities. Foreigr-owned
financial institutions were, and are, welcome in principle and
notjust tolerated. They have been offered a high degree of
political, econornic and social stability and security.
The main factors contributing to such a prodrctive climate
ar6 surmurized in table 3. More general conditions such as
the stable political climate, the quality of the workforce, the
geographical location in Europe's economic centre, or its ab-
solute freedom of capital movernents affecting virtually all
sectors are not listsd in this table.
None of these factors are unique to Luxembourg. There are
tax free havens wtrich offer more generou tax breaks an( in
addition, the large neighbouring cormtries at least partly ful-
fil these requirements. But Luembourg started to liberalize
its capital markets early and to create an efficient environ-
mmt. Starting early has paid offalready.
Table 2: Flnenclel Sector
Importrncc ln EEC Counhler (19tt)
Country Grocr VrlueAddd ln Brnklng rnd
Insunncc
Thousrnd Blllton SbereofTotal
Ecu Per Ecu Totel Domesdc Value
caplte Addd (%)
Luxembourg28.49
IIK 19.35
Germany 8.13
Belglum 8.09
France 717
Netherlands 6.76
Italy 510
Denmerk 4.98
Ireland 436
Spaln 3.65
Portugal 2.45
Greece 0.94
ECTotal 8.34
1.07
ll0.4l
49.96
8.01
41.42
9.E8
32.77
2.55
r.54
t4.14
2.52
0.94
m.2l
t7.80
16.20
5.10
6.60
5.60
5.50
4.80
3.00
6.50
5.80
7.30
2.50'
6.60 t
t share of GDP
Source: Eurostat Table 3: Specillcs In The Regulatory
Framework
Provlslon Regulatory Framework
No witttholding tax on Eurobond market,
foreigr int€rest income Euromoney market, Private
banking
Favourable tax t@tnent Frmd business
for foreigr holding
companies' income
Favourable tax feament Re-insrrance
for insurance companies'
income
Banking secrecy Private banking
Liberal rules for foreign
banks' settlement
Ihe Economlc end Flnanclel Sltuaflon ln
Prospects
tlnlike most ofthe othermajor financial centres inthe worl(
Luxembourg's markets are built on a very clear and rather
qpecialized product structure and completely tied to the de-
velopment of international finance in general. Therefore,
without the background of a large home market and a
broadly diversified financial senrices industry, risks as ncll
as further growth and profit potential are larger than usual.
The likely firure path will be detennined by the imminent
structual shifrs on the financial rnarkets such as :
- 
a general slowdorvn in the trends touards securitization (al-
though no long term reversal) is likely;
- 
the relative restraint ofpublic borrourers on the European
capital markets, partly enforced by EMUenfyconditions;
- 
a revival of loan financing, notably in the developing zones
ofEastern Europe as borrowers from there are excluded
from the standard securities markets for the medium term;
- 
a further increase in derivatirc products trading partly re-
placing tade in the rmderlying securities themselves (at
least until they are completely paperless) for cost rcasons;
- 
the market will become firther sophisticated and separaled
between institutiorul and retail investors, with latter losing
in importance.
Luxembor:rg has a good chance ofbenefiting ftom such de-
velopments:
- 
it is well prepared for the specific needs ofinstitutional in-
vestors on the one hand and retail clients (frnds, private
banking) on the other;
- 
it shouldbenefit frorn a gradual strift towardsnon-sovereip
borrowers, because these have no horne market attachment
comparable to that of govenments;
- 
it is well positioned as a low tax are4 wtren increased capi-
tal mobility continues to reap such advantages in tax treat-
ment; it could even profit from the liberalization in Eastern
Europe;
- 
it will gradually gain a'home market" zubstitute, as finan-
cial integration and ctrrency union in Europe will progress,
with Luxembourg always in the leading grorry ofcornties,
with its banl6, insuanoe companies and sectnities induSry
all benefiting
But, certain risks exist for the financial sector in the Grand
Duchy i.e.:
- 
Luxembourg has no active securities trading on a large
scale. This places it at a constant disadvantage in relation
to o&er c€nfes with stong exchanges (in terms of turn-
over). The complete lack of futures and options hading fa-
cilities will aggrarate this drawback;
- 
as financial senrices will also, in the fiStue, increase at an
above average rat€ and athact more resoruces, the tight la-
botr and real estate markets in the country could poseproh,
lems.
- 
an EC-wide trannonization in the field ofminimum reserve
requirements (as a consequemce of monetary union) or in-
terest income taxation (wittrholding tax for all EC residents)
might affed Luxembourg's attactiveness to sorne prirate
banlcing clients. Though this might not be considered to bo
a problem for the near future.
4. CONCLUSTONS
Fonmore than a decade the Luxembourg economyhas grown
at a faster pace than other Member States. Employment has
risen since 1984, particularly fast in the last few years,
foreigr labor:r, both rcsident and non-resident increasing sig-
nificantly. lnflation has been modest and all the indicators of
nominal convergence are satisfactory. Luxemborrg complies
without difficulty with all five criteria defined for EMU.
The prospering ofthe Luxunbourg economy during a period
of severe difficulties in world steel markes is remarkable. In
a period of twenty years the economy has gone ttuough a
process of rapid "de-industrialization" and its over-depurd-
€nce on steel has been greatly reduced. The goverrrnent's
policy for industrial diversification has largely contributed to
both steering and accommodating this adaptation process. As
part ofthese policies, the financial sector has seen a particu-
larly fast expansion. In spite of its importance to the
county's economy, Luxembowg's financial cenhe is ofonly
modest size in an intemational context. It has, nevertheless,
been able to develop an important role in particular niche
markets.
The government is continuing iC policy for diversification
and further encouraging investment in other services indrs-
tries. The recent adaptation ofnational legislation should en-
sure that future policies entirely comply with EC
competitionlaw
Possible risk factors for medium term groMh that could be
identified involve the recent decline in productivity growth
and, on the otherhand, constraints that rnay occur on the sup-
ply of labour. The govemment has demonstrated, however,
great flexibility and an ability to adapt to changing circum-
stances and less favourable developments.
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The llnencld scctor end the measurenrent of economlc output
The size of the Luxernbourg ecsromy and is specific position as an intemaiional financial centre involve two paflicu-
lar aspects in relation to the measuement and interpretation of economic outpU.
l. The first one concerns the evalgation of the banking sector in measuring gfoss domestic product, GDP. According
to standard national accounts methodolory value added ofthe banking sector is considered as an intermediary
prodgc!i.e. asaninprtfortheothersectonbfthe economy, implicitlyincludedintheirvalue added. ConseqrEntly,
in rhe calculation oia country's GDB in order to avoid double couting, the value added of the banking sector is
deduded frmrthe suntotal ofialueadded forredin0re other seclors.TheLuxe,mbourgbankingsector,however,
.exports- abott 8(P/o of its sewices to foreip clieirts. The application of the international definition implies that
these exported banking services are not rcflected in Lrxembotrg's GDP. Therefore, SIATEC, the goverrrnent stat-
istical service, produ,is, in parallel with GDP series aocording to the intemational definitioq also GDP series in-
cluding an estimate for tiresi exporte<l banking sen ices. In coneqpondence with the developrment of gross margins
of the [anking sector, the discrepancy between the two has shoum considerable variatior and declined at ttre e,nd
ofthe eig[rties. In I 9g-9 aut I 990 the *IATEC raersion of GDP was I I to I 2% higher than GDP nreasrred according
to intemational convention
2. Secondly, Luxemrborrg's unrsgal position has resrlted in an important gap to occurtetween gr. oss domestic pro-
duct and gross nationalproduct. In t 990, GDP - gross production fonrpd on Luxembourg tenitory - amounted to
LFR 291 .5 billion. Gros national produc( however, was LFR 397.2 billior in that yea4l6Yomore. The differcnce
is orplained by the important net-flow of income from abroad. In 1990 net capital eamings from abroad were
LFR] l7.l biUioq ag"i" of GDP. Their sfongest rise occurred at the end of the seventies; between 1980 and 1990
they were 35% of bDp on average. Net+amings on capital largely offset the negative net-balance in salaries (LFR
I 1.4 billion in 1990,4o/oof GDP). kr the last few years, net salary payments have been rapidly increasing thouglt,
reflecting the rise in frontier workers (in 1986 net-salary payments were still less than LFR I billion).
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PART II
SPECIAL TOPICS
CHAPTER 1
THE FINANCIAL SECTOR *
1. Introductlon and Overview
Relatlve slze
The financial sector ofluambourg shows anumber ofchar-
acteristics which clCIrly distinguish it from those of other
countries. The sector's importance, measured by any
meaningful indicator, in relation to the country's overall
economic size, is considerable :
- 
Financial services contibute( in 1990, ovet l5o/o of Lrx-
embourg's GDI tp from llo/orn l980utdjust 3o/oinl{10.
- 
The banking sector alone aocounte{ in mid I 99 l, for 8 JYo
of total employment, up from 4,8o/o in 1980 and 2,9o/o in
1970.
- 
Financial serviceq too, play an important role in general
economic developnent; gross fixed capital formation ofthe
financial seclorgrewbetween 1983 and 1989 onaverageby
22Yo ayat nrcal terrns, comp arcdto 6,60/0 for the economy
as a whole.
- 
The contribution of financial transactions to the external
balance of Luxenrbourg is considerable : net factor income
from abroad amounts to about 25% of GDP.
Internatlond orlentatlon of the linenclal markets
In comparison to other major financial c€mtr€s in Europe,
Luxembourg almost exclusively serves its international
clientele, for obvious reasolls, as the domestic base is rather
narow Thus, for example, at the end of l99l out of 187
banks in Luxembourg, l62wEre from ouside the BLEU.
This stong "export orientation" ofits financial services has
several major implications :
- 
It puts Luxembourg into a high degree of competitiorl
which other financial centres, such as London, Paris or
Frankfurt do not faoe, since the latter can build a good deal
oftheir business on a rather inelastic donrcstic dernand.
- 
There is a crucial dependence on the froedorn ofinterna-
tional capital flows, especially onLuxembourg's side, but
also with regard to its main partners, Germany, Fran@,
. Switaerland or Scandinavia.
- 
As the international business share is so big, the estab-
listrment ofspecific'bffshore facilities" to separate domes-
tic and intemational business would not be meaningful.
Thrs Luxemrbourg carL indee4 claim not to harrc a special
offshore centre.
Generel stmcture
Luxembourg's financial services are clearly dominated by
the banking industry. More than sixteen thousand people
work there, whereas in insurance there are only 969 (end
1988) and in non-banking financial establishments at the
mme period, 379.
The latter group will, inevitably increase its stnre as the im-
portance of the fimd business increases further.
Lrxemboug relies on four productJines :
- 
traditionally the Ernocunency market business (ltr/o of
that in US$ and DM);
- 
additionally since the 1970s, the Errobond market, issuing
and even more clearing and listing;
- 
more recently, after the sluggistr period ofthe early 1980s,
prirate banking, including portfolio management and gold
mtug;
- 
an4 for a few years, the mutual fund indusry.
lvlany other products do exist but play no major role in the
banking sector.
Pmt-wer development
In curtrast to runy of is main competitors, Luxernbourg's
venture into the financial markets is relatively recert. Just
thirty yean ago, in I 96 I , there were only I 9 banks on recor4
and of those 5 foreigr institutions.
The early, andmid" sixtiesmarkthe beginning ofthe fast de-
velopment of Luxembourg as a banking location. Some
legislative action added to that. The 1962 US "interest
eqtralization tat'', which created the wittthol{ing tax prshed
large amourts of dgllars on le-tlts Eu.o lvIaftet'iiiil'ftorn
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there into Lrxembourg. Another more recent example was
that oftheFederal Republic of Germanywhich introduced as
of 1.1.1989, a l0% withholding tax on interest income. The
gemun authorities appear to have been surprised by the de-
gree of the present-day intemational mobility of capital
which resulted in a heary outflow of capial from Germany
and just 6 months later the lawwas abolished.
The early 1980s saw a phase of sluggish development in
Luxunbourg's financial markets, due to the disnrptions in in-
temational capital flows, created by the second oil strock.
But from the mid-1980s onwards, Luxembourg's financial
markets resumed their stong growtlr, wtrich has continued
until now.
Legal and lnsfltudonal framework
The remarkable developmmt ofa financial cenhe farbeyond
its domestic needs has taken place in a legal and instihrtional
environment which, in comparison to other counhies, has
clearly enhanced this trend. The funncial industry received
stpport in efforts to establish itself as a strong and unerging
sector at a relatively early stage so as to enhance sectoral
change in the Grand Duchy and to diversify its induSrial
base. This support takes different forms, especially the fol-
lowing which will be discussed later in detail in the chapters
dealing with the different parts of the financial sector.
a) The tax system
there is no withholding tax on capital income
from non-domestic companies.
there is a very favourable taxation ofholding
companies and companies in the mutual fund
business, the income of these remains un-
taxed; there is essentially only a registration
tax on the company's net asset value (due to
this fact, Spanish tax codes, for example,
regard Luxembourg as a tax-free haven).
global corporate income tax is fairly low, has
been lowered in the last few years (to 39%
total) and will be further lowered next year.
there is no stamp duty on sales on the stock
exchange.
since I 979 there has been no VAT on the sale
ofgold.
foreigners do not have to pay any property or
estate tax.
b) Bankingrules and supervision
foreign banks are free to establish branches
in Luxembourg. Licences are, in accordance
with the EEC directive of 1977, issued by the
Treasury on the fulfillment ofcapital require-
ment and personal reputation of the execu-
tives.
the supervision ofthe banking and financial
sectors in general is centralised with the "In-
stitut Mon6taire Luxembourgeois"; (Insur-
ance supervision is carried out by an
independent institution, however, and stock
exchange supervision is in the hands of a
stock exchange supervisory commissioner).
the principle of banking secrecy does not
apply in any criminal matter.
c) The existence of the stock exchange with liberal listing
requirernents
d) The general political frameworlg which is especially
desoibedby
an overall stability
a firm embodiment in the common market as
well as in the Belgian Luxembourg Econ-
omic Union and the European Monetary Sys-
tem.
Altogether these lead to a finrancial centre which combines a
favourable treatment comparable to those of "free havgns"
and on the other hand, a direct positioning within one of the
most developed parts of the world's industrialised counhies
and a county specific'tisk prernium" wtrich is negligible.
2. The Banking Industry
Slze
The banking sector, as outlined in the laS chapter, is the core
of the financial sector in general. At the end of l99l there
were 187 banks in Luxembourg authorised by the Treasury.
35 of them were banks established under foreign law. All the
others were established under Luxembourg law. However,
there is some "double-counting" : several foreignbanks have
branches established, govemed by foreign law, and in paral-
lel, afliliates under Luxembourg law. Besides these courmer-
cial banks, there are 47 rulal credit corporations (Caisse
Rurale/ Raiffeisur) which mainly serve the domestic nral
population and smaller domestic clients in general.
Table l.l gives an overview of development and a geo-
graphical breakdown ofthe banks. It shows that develop-
ment has taken place in several waves, with the pronounced
Table 1.1: Geographlcal Base of Parent
Companies of Banks in Luxembourg
1975 1980 1985 1990 l99t
Luxembourg/Belgium 1,2 12 12
Germany 16 29 29
France 5 6 7Swltzerland 5 7 7
usA 15 ll l1
Others 23 46 52
Total 76 lll 118 I
'EEC.
EFTA
Others
Source: IML
22 25
38 4020 21
t6 t7
t2 1069 74
77 r87
99 106
37 384t 43
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intemrptiom in the early 1980s. It shoun the early arrival of
US ba*s, after the intoduction of the withholding tax in
1962.later oq however, other centres, especially Nassau"
ernerged as stong competitors for US buiness. The second
wave of inflow was led by German banls, wtrich started in
the sixties in order to escape the stiff German minimum
reserve requirements and later the withholding tax of 1989.
Iatnly, however, French and Swis burks, especially, have
increased their presence in Luxanbourg, although for differ-
ent reasons. Frerrch banking has followed the liberalisation
measures taken in the second half of the 1980s.
The Swiss banks rse Luembourg more and more as a foot-
hold in the EEC and as an additional c€nhe to London in the
Euro moneymarlcets. lbking into account the respective size
of the banks, the pre+minence of the German institutions is
becoming clearer : in terms of total asset size these held a
share of almo*34o/o of the total market at end 1990.
As several exceptional reasons simultaneously gave a push
to the Luxernbourg financial markets and in a phase of slow-
ing world-wide monetary growt[ one has again to expect an
imminent slowdown in international demand for Luxem-
bourg's banking in general an4 therefore, a slowing of new
establishments.
Additionally, the tight labour market in Lu:amborrg makes
any estrablishment or enlargement inoeasingly difficult. Al-
rcady 48Yo of all employees in the banking sector are for-
eigners, from juS 34o/o fle years ago. And, whereas in the
past foreigners were mainly found in executive positions, in-
stitutions are increasingly forced to bring their staff with
them even for non-management positions. The over-propor-
tional increase of foreigners during the last five years mainly
stemmed from the sharp increase in non+xecutive person-
nel. On the managenrent level, the strare of foreigrers has
been stable atarormd62%o for the past 15 years.
After the liquidation ofBCCI (see page 16), the largest banks
behind Deutsche Bank, are three domestic banks, the Banque
Intemationale de Lrxembourg, the Banque G6n6rale de Lux-
embourg, and the Banque Caisse d'Epargrc. They are the
largest institutions in the country with total balance sheets
cunently accounting for 600 bn.
The balance sheet
kr line with the increase in the nrrnber of banks operating in
Luxembourg their combined assets gew strongly as well.
Between 1980 and 1990 assets grew at an annual average
rate of nearly l0%, and faser in the second half of the last
decade than in the first half.
The gross structure of the combined balance sheet already
shows some of the changes which have taken place within
the last decade : Thble 1.2 gives the balance stleet shuchre
ofthe Luxembourg banks. In 1980, the Luxembourg banks
net interbank deposit position was negative :73.5% of tbe
liabilities were Interbank positions, whereas oriy 51.9/o
were on the asset side. This negative interbank position
corresponded to a positive position against non-banks. In
particular, lending, at35%o, still had a considerable share. A
main activity of Luxernbourg banking was corporate financ-
ing, not least of German firms, outside the regulated domes-
tic German market.
In 1990, this relationship changed profoundly. "Private
banking" grew dramatically in importance; deposit gathering
amongst private individuals, mainly in the medium income
range, was highly successfirl. At the end of 1990, non-bank
deposits amounted to over 40o/o of total liabilities. Demand
deposits inoeased markedly to 24.syo. Time-deposits did not
do quite as well in the early and mid-1980s, but more re-
cently, following the world-wide rise in short-term interest
rates, have grown substantially. Savings deposits play a
minor role in this context. So Luxembourg's financial centre
has now developed into a location with a negative net posi-
tion against non-banks; the private clients'deposits are,
therefore, deposited on the euromarkets at other institutions
in other centres.
Business in Luxembourg mostly takes place in foreign cur-
rency. The balance sheets consistently show assets and lia-
bilities in foreigrr crrrrency between around 80% and 90%.
The statistical fall in the share of foreign curency positions
between 1985 and 1990, is only due to the US$ depreciation
during this period and not to a genuine change in brxiness
practice.
Holdings of securities are relatively minor on average with
a l2o/o shzre of all assets, though slowly increasing. Widely
cited "securitisation" obviously did not have as strong an im-
pact on Luxembourg's banking, with its special geographical
and product range ofbusiness, as in other banking centres.
Table 1.2: Luxembourg Banks' Balance-sheet
Structure
1980 1985 1990
Total Assets @n FLux)
of whlch ln foreign
currency (%)
of whlch (%)
Bank deposlts
Inans
Securities
Others
Total
Total (Llabilities/Bn FLux)
of whlch ln forelgn
currency (%)
of which
Bank deposits
Deposlts
- Demend Deposits
- Time Deposits
Capital, Reserves,
Provisions
Others
Total
3917.0 7628.A 12480.0
85.6 88.5 84.8
59.1 54.1 60.4
35.r 32.t 24.0
8.3 11.0 I1.8
4.7 2.8 3.8
100.0 100.0 100.0
3917.0 7628.0 12480.0
84.8 87. r 84.4
73.5 66.7 47.0
18.6 23.0 40.2
9.2 14.5 24.5
7.9 7.4 14.7
5.1 8.9 tt.1
2.8 1.4 Ll
100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: IML, own calculations
(3)
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Capital, resewes and provisions have been increased during
recent )rears. 1988 and 1989 eqpecially saw a significant
capital infisim, wbereas loan and other provisiurs had to be
piled up in ttrc early 1980s, as els€u/herc in tbe banking in-
dusty, frm 0.3% of all assets in 1980 to 2.9/om 1986. Cal-
culations bytho IMLshow fc 1990 a capital base in relation
to tho risk uteightod asseb of 8.9olo on sverage; clearly ex-
ceeding ttrc 8% tbreshold set up by the Cooke Commithe; a
case by case calqrlation revealed, that at the eod of 1990, a
volurne-weighted 60/o of all banks has capital exceeding this
8% lewl. h terms of capitral adequacy, concluions strould
be drawn careftlly : the najority ofthe banks are affiliates of
foreigp bar*s, urd, thaefore, tbrough formal guanntees,
drawupon more tpsources thanju$ their oun furds.
New and off-balar€-sheet financial inshrnents arc used by
the banking sector bU still urly to a moderato od€nl lhd€r-
uniting facilities, like MF's (Norc Issuance Pacility) or
RIJF s (Revolving Underuriting Facility), as well as stand-
ard, exchang+traded finures and options play a very minor
role and amount together to just one percent of the aggrogpte
balance sheets. The sitrntion in tho intertanking martet of
int€r€st rate suaps urd fornard rate agoements oo curen-
cies is very different. These tuo types each reached an aggre-
gate total of almost LFR 1.800 billion at the end of 1990,
each represe,nting commimenc ofarormd l4o/o of tb agre-
gate bank balance streets. It is clear that for sorne institutims
whicharcmorc prone to sucn inshments, therelativecom-
mitrn€ot is mwh higher. On the ottrcr hand" it has to be kept
inmind that 0rcse figures aro gross figure* Netting opposite
commitments between institutions would result in much
lowerlwets.
Curency dlshlbutlon on the Eurocurrency Merkets
Luxunbourg's banking sector traditionally does business
and trading in all maju conraertible currcncies. Ther€ ar€,
however, clear priorities in this kind of buiness with regard
to crrmencies. The Euroourmcy market buiness in Lttxem-
bourg cvolved in the 196& mainly as US$ bwiness; later
DM loans urd agoin later, DM deposits einerged as major
areas of buiness. These two cunqrcies, US$ and Dlvl, have
retained their position as tbe domimnt curencies in Lrxem-
bourg.
Table 1.3 gives an overyien, of the ornerrcy distribution of
the Euocurrency brsiness based in Lrxunbourg (left col-
umn). DM and US$ together account for about 60ole of the
Euroorrercy markets in Luembourg. But other currencies
harrc gaircd additional importance &ring recent yea$, not-
ably the F[, business in which ircreased sturply in 1990.
Looking at these martet shares in Luxembourg in relation to
orrerall euromarlcet brsiness in Europe, especially in Lon-
doq the specific profile of btsiness in Luxemborg can be
noticed- Luxunbourg has very strong positions within the
total markets in DM liF'and SFR- On the other han4 ofrela-
tively minor importanco are deposih in US$ (as the total
rnarkots here arc so large) md Yen. Here, in these two world-
wido traded orrencies, London with its even mor€ int€ma-
tional banking centre has the lead in Europe. Luxembourg's
overall sttare h8s, especially with regard to deposits by non-
banks, st€adily increased sirpe the early 1980s. Its relative
position is stronger in the non-bank market (end 1990 around
I P/o) than in the interbank market. This corresponds with the
fact that int€rbank ru*ets are for Lrxembourg less import-
ant(57%) than forall the European euromarkets together, on
arcrage Q4%).It holds a slure of 16% in the non-bank mar-
ket of all Enrope's markets as compared to just 7,5%o (lW/o
loang 8% deposits) in the interbank rnarket. However, as the
curency distribution of Luxembourg's market does not
match the total, exchange rat€ movements (DlvIrUS$) affect
these market strare figrnes significantly.
Prontebttlty
Aocording to IML figures, in 1990 the banking sector oper-
ated with a net rate of retum on its own funds (capital and
reservCI) of 6.80/o @ble l.a). Profits, therefore, continued
their downward tend from the unusually high 1988 levels.
hcreasing provisions for loan losses (in 1990 amounting to
36% of gross income) and mounting labour costs (ernploy-
ment increased between 1985 and 1990 by 60%o) go together
with increasing competition and a more diflicult general
economic environment. Agaq one has to take into accourt
the fact that, due to close economic links between Luxem-
Table 1.4: Profit before Tares of Banks ln
Luxembourg
Per employee Percentage of
(Mlo. Flur) Canltd + Reserves
19t6 2.37 9.2
1987 2.23 9.2
1988 2.88 tt.1
1989(1) 2.38 9.5
1990(1) t.1t 5.8
1991(1) 2.00 8.7
(l) Without BCCI
Source: IML, own calculatious
Teble 1.3: Currency Breakdown of
Lurembourg's Euromoney Market
(Percentege flgures as of 31.12.1991)
Lurembourg's
Curencles */ool
Luxembourg's
Totd
Luxembourg's
Markets *Ye ol
Total European
Euromoney Market
Assets Llabillttes Assets Llabllities
DEM
II'
GBP
ECU
34.5 38.2 25.8 20.6
I1.4 I1.8 36.5 33.8
3.0 3.5 8.6 8.8
59 4.4 tl.2 70
USD
SER
YEN
24.6 2t.t8.5 8.4
I I t2
6.2 4.720.3 t4.3
tg ls
()THNRS toR
Lurembourg
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 9.9I1.0
Source: IML, BIS, own calculatioas
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Table 1.5: Bank Profiteblllty ln Lurembourg
19t6 1991(1)
In %oftotd In Toofeverege IaTooltold In Toofrverege
gro$ ltrcome asset clze gross lncome $set clzc
Net lnterest lncome
Commlsslon and other lncome
Total gross lncome
Personnel expenseg
Other general erpens$ +
Depreclatlon of non-flnanclel assets
Taxes (other, than on lncome)
Total expenses
Gross prolit
Provislons and Depreclatlon
on llnanclal essetc
Taxes on lncome
Prolits
78.6
2t.4
r00.0
16.9
I1.8
2.2
30.8
69.2
46.t
10.3
12.8
l.l I
0.30
l.4l
0.24
0.17
0.03
0.44
1.00
0.66
0.15
0.18
26.5
100.0
2t.2
15.5
2.0
40.5
59.5
36.9
6.4
16.2
0.86
0.31
r.t7
0.25
0.2t
0.02
0.47
0.69
0.42
0.07
0.19
(l) Without BCCI
Source: IML, own calculations
bourg's affiliate banks and their foreigr parent companies,
the capital recorded in the accounts rmderstates the effectirae
liable capital.
In 1990, the two banks with the largest profits werc foreign-
owned institutions; the IGedietbank Luxembourg ud DG
Bank Intemational with profits of 1,92 and 1,65 bn LFR re-
spectively. With the anival of new b6nks, the inoeasing in-
ternational competition in private banking, the further
deregulation of major competing financial centres and
mounting operating costs, it is at least doubtftl if ttrc degree
of profitability enjoyed in the late eighties is sustainable in
the medirmr terrn One institution. But the figures still seem
to strow a degree ofprofitability wttich e:aeeds, for example,
that ofbanla in Germanyand Belgium.
l99l saw a remarkable orrerall increase in profitability, due
less to increased income than to a succesful cost cutting,
mainly in the field of personnel expenses.
Supervlslon and regulatlon
Supervision
The task of banking supervision is asigted !o the In-
stitut Mon6taire Lu<embourgeois (IML). Althoug[ the
Treasury is formally responsible for permission to es-
tablish new bar*s, it also draws on the stpport of the
IML.
The establistunent ofnew banks or branches is, as al-
ready ortline( in principle, free. The conditios are of
a silficiently qualified management and adequate capi-
tal of at least 350 million frarrcs. No special rules apply
for non{omestic reqrrsts for establishrnenq and there
are also no reciprocity reserrrations. Orrent supervi-
sion takes the form of minimum operating ratios con-
cerning risk exposure and liquidity and regular
inspectiors.
Deposit insrrance
As a consequence of the EC recommendation of
22.12.1986, in l"Iay 1989 a deposit insrance sctrerne
nas established for the first time. For that purpose, the
"Association pour la garantie des d6p0ts" was estab-
lished. Deposits of up to 500.000 LFRarc covered"
In January I 992 the govemment proposed a general fin-
ancial ma*ets law, updating peviors laurs and there-
fore providing an even morp structured and transparent
legal code for the finarpial corununity. It will also take
into account the new EC legislation on banking (2nd
banking directive).
Luunbourg implenrented the EC directirrc on insider
rading by passing a law dealing with this matter.
Intmr rtlonel compeff fr on
Operating withou a sizeable domestic clientele and mainly
in wholesale banking Luxembotrg's buking industry, as
zuch, is in sigrificant competition with other places. This
adds to the competition betweem Luunbourg's banks.
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The main competitor in the Euocunenry business is Lon-
don. London has in this field the higher market share, a more
diversified curency structure and a broader general banking
sector. Luxembourg is not in a position to challenge Lon-
don's lead. But it has gained the role of a succ€ssful 'tnid-
player", especially in the Continental currencies aad for
European clients. With the gadual strift away from the US-
Dollar as the only reserve qurency and the fiuther opening
up of Europe's capital markets, Lrxembourg's position in the
Eurocurrenry market business might enen be enhanced, pro-
vided that the regulatory adrantages over ottrcr Continental
locations continue to prerail.
Luxembourg's banks have also built up another 'lroduct
Iine" around privale banking and portfolio managunent. In
this market Ziirich is also a dominant competitor. Luxem-
bourg has tried to establistr itself in the market for medium to
high net worth private clients and to leave the very upper
market segment to Ziirich. The basic rationale behind this be-
haviour lies in its different cost structure : Ziirich provides its
services at higher costs than Luxernbourg, a fact that matters
in the medium market range. But Switzerland has been suc-
cessfi.rl in diminishing its disadrantage in securities'com-
missions. Besides costs, banking secrecy is an important
competitive factor.
Supplemmtary to the banls, specialised asset rnanagernent
companies operat€ in Lrxembourg. They are established and
supervised under a law passed only in 1990. In Novernber
1991, 15 zuch firms were establistre( primarily subsidiaries
of foreigr banks, brokers and insurance companies.
The gBCCI Case'
The Breakdorrn
On 5 July 1991, the Bank of England took the initiative to
secure conhol of the assets of banks in the BCC Grorp; the
action was carried out by parallel action in seven countries,
one of them Luxembourg. BCCI, the "Bank of Credit and
Commerce Intemational"
- 
had its operational headquarters in the centre ofacti-
vities in London, UK;
- 
its ultimate majority shareholder in Abu Dhabi;
- 
its registration and the seat of the holding company
(BCCI Holdings) in Luxemboug;
- 
offices in about seventy cormties, worldvide.
During the process of irvestigating BCCI's business acti-
vities after the closing in July last year, it was discovered
that:
- 
assets ofaround 1 . I 6 US$ face total liabilities ofaround
10.6 bn US$, almost tenfold the amount;
- 
over at least ten years, the bank concealed foreigr ex-
change losses ofat least I bn US$, it did not report de-
posits to the value of several hundred Mio US$;
- 
BCCI was operating under less than perfect conditions
of supervision, because the bank's seat and its oper-
ational cenhes were separat€, becatrse there was wide-
spread criminal activity on the part of the bank's man-
agers to mislead the regulators, and because the auditor
for a long time seemed to rely on the principal share-
holder's willingness to bear losses.
The consequences for Luxembourg as r llnanclal cenke
BCCI was, in terms of assets, Luxemboug's largest
non-affiliated bank. At the end of 1989, the balance
sheet total amounted to 358 bn LFR, at least as offr-
cially reported. This meant a share of Luxembourg
banl6 total balance sheet ofalmost3.2o/o.
- 
Losses for other banks or other creditors in Luxem-
bourg occurrcd btt were rather minor compared to total
business or also compared to the UK and the USA,
where the majority of depositors resided. The BCCI
was nevera large participant inLuxembourg's Eurocur-
rency market, which could otherwise have caused
heavy losses for partrrer banks.
- 
A difficult effect to assess is the one on the reputation
ofluxembotng's banking sector in gureral. hejudices
seemed to be confrrned which judge Luxernboug as a
financial free havenwith favourable tax regulation and
lack of supervision. The special circumstances of
BCCI and the achral good track record of the IML are
sometimes overlooked.
3. The securities markets
General situation
Historically, Luxernbourg has always relied upon financial
markets which are fairly integrated and complementary to
each other. In partiorlar, there has never been a regulatory
distinction between the banking and securities industry; the
banks are the major participan6 in the secrrities markets and
therefore'tniversal banks" in the classical sense.
As in the banking industry, Luxembourg's securities rnarkets
are highly integrated within the intemational financial mar-
kes. The importance of Luxembourg as a market for se-
curities again lies not in the matching of domestic savings
with domestic investment but insiead in its role as a spe-
cialised market place for the international financial com-
munity.
The bond market
The major segment of the securities market is the Eurobond
market.
A few important factors have contributed to this :
- 
the freedom to issue debt in foreigr and (in the mean-
time also) own curency;
the existence ofbearerbonds, which allows the identity
ofthe bond holder to be concealed;
again" the absence, as in other countries, of any with-
holding tax as an incentive for private investors;
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the monetary association with Belgium an( therefore,
private clients' demand from Belgium;
the arailability of the stock oahange for bond listing.
This has allorved Luxembourg to take on a leading role in in-
ternational fixed income securities. But only the sharp in-
crease in international investment in the 1980s led to a
qpectacular increase in the Luxembourg bondmarket.
Table 1.6 shows the figues for the years 1985 and 1991.
Gross bond issues in 1990 amourtedto207,? billion frarcs.
Almost 7T/o werc isnred as prirrate placements that means
without advertisement and prospectrs. Private placements
have become increasingly popular within the last fewyearg
as they give issuer and investor the necessary flexibility to
optimise their specific stratery on the capital mad(ets. In
Luxembourg, a prirate placement is often widely spread at
the underuniting and investor level. It is prirate only in so far
as the absence ofprospectuses and advertising is concerned.
Two+hirds of the arnount issued on Luxembourg's bond
markets were issued by foreigr bonowers, wtro take advant-
age of the relatively cheap possibility to raise funds in Lu"r-
unbourg. Bonds denominated in US$, CAD, ECU, and LFR
itsell in particular, are the cornerstones ofthe bond market.
The market for bonds denominated ln Lurembourg
Francs
The LFR bonds are especially attractive due to their freedom
fiom withholding ax for the holder. Therefore, especially
Belgian retail investors can easily avoid their domestic with-
holding tax without any currency risk.
Due to these differences between the Belgian and Lrxem-
bourg bond market, a yield differential between these two
rnarkets prenils. lrntil 1984, Belgian rat€s persist€ntly su-
passed those in Luxunbourg by more than one percentage
point. In more recent yearq this differential has narrowed" al-
thougb in 1990 it uas again around one percentage point.
However, as of l.l.l99l Belgium lowered its withholding
tax on residents'interest income frsrn?Syotojust l0%, hop-
ing to actirate its domestic retail bond market. Whether this
rurrowing of the tax gap between the two countries will be
enough to rpcuperat€ considerable business lost to Luxem-
bourg has to be seen. At least, some Belgian corporations
harae started again to iszue bonds in Belgium designated for
retail in/estors.
Sinc€ 1990, the market for bonds denominated in, or other-
wise linked to, the Franc has been considerably liberalised-
Now any issuer is firce to proceed with his iszue whenever
and hovwer it is conwnient for him. There only rernairs the
obligation to inform the authorities, the admission and queu-
eing procedure, therefore, has been completely abolished.
This step will, in the medium tenrL increase the volume of,
and competition in, the LFR bond market. Underwriting
fees, therefore, are about to fall. Another important step also
for Luxembourg is the start of the Belgian fuhres and op-
tions market BELFOX, as this allows institutional investors
to hedge even better against interest changes and to adopt a
more flexible invesrnent shat€gy. But already in 1990 the ef-
fects of this liberalization were felt; issues increased by
l47o/o olrer a relatively weak I 989 figtre. Both segmurts, pri-
rate placements and public issues, benefited roughly equally.
Althongh Belgian bonowers remained on top, Frenchbor-
rowers extended their use of this market especially, whereas
the former importance of Scandinavian borrowers dwindled
further. In l99l the market registered another 25% rise of
new issues, with Belgian and French iszuers again increasing
their market share to a combined figure of almost 50%. The
classical shaight bonds dominate the market. Exceptions are
\rcry rare : in lv{arch I 99 l, LFR I bn were raised by an equity
linked issue after the last non+lassical isstre dating back to
mid-1989.
The Eurobond market
The Eurobond martet is eraen more important for the Luxem-
bourg financial institutiors than the LFR market for bonds.
The martet in general, wtrich comprises the issue of bonds
denominated in curencies other than the one legal in the
cormby of iszue, has become a major source of intemational
corporate and official authorities'financing. The issue ofEu-
robonds grcw more than tenfold from 1980 to 1990, despite
the fact that regulatory consensus still restricts this market,
notably the opposition of the German authorities to DM Eu-
robonds.
Lrxenrborrg participates in this market in different ways :
its banks act as underuniters of primary debt;
the banks and other financial institutions hade these in-
strum€mts in the primary and secondary market;
the exchange lists a good part of them;
the local clearing house provides its services in this
market.
Table 1.6: Gross Bond Issues ln Lurembourg
Breakdown of Prlncipal Tlpes
(BN @n FLur) ShareFLux) (ln %)
Publlc lssues 15.9 Vl.2 42.0
Government and 1.5
publlc enterprlres
1.0 0.5
Prlvate domestlc 7.2 l7.l 8.2
enterprlses
Rest of theworld 7.2 69.1 33.3
Prlvate placements ll.7 120.5 58.0
Domestlc flnancld 2.9
lnstltutions
4.3 21.1
Rest of the world 8.9 76.2 36.7
Totrl Bond Issues n.6 207.7 100.0
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According to IML figures, in 1988 Luxembourg's banks took
partun 16.4% of nouly underwritten capital in the Eurobond
market. Being the latest a\ra.ilable figure, it is not clear if the
slig[rt dovnnard tend over the last 15 years bas continued
until recently. It seems to be tbat the successful placernent of
new bonds rests les on Luxembourg's investors' demand
than a decade ago.
One has to be prudent in the interpretation ofa possible tend
in these figureq howwer, as they do not reveal the actual
surns placed by different banks. It might be that juS ttrough
an average reduction in the number ofbanks per issue, this
share could have been statistically decroasing, without a real
loss ofmarket strare in underwriting. Another set of statistics
could even support the view that Luembourg's banks are
not about to lose a slure in global placing power : the OBCD
statistics on foreign bonds (as a part oftotal Eurobonds,
underuryitten only in a single country) show that Lrxem-
bourg in 1990 had a strare of 9.4%o (far behind Switzerland
with almost SVlo). This share was higher than the year be-
fore. But as mentioned, these figures cover only a relatively
small and probably biased part of all intemational bond of-
ferings.
In contrast to the above-mentioned figures, those for market
listing of Eurobonds show an enormors and susuained im-
portance of the Luxernbourg exchange : in 1988 almost 67%
of all new Eurobonds were listed on the Luxemboug ex-
change, a strare clearly aborre that ten or fifteen years ago.
The exchange enjoys its ovenvhelming popularity due to its
liberal listing requirements and its closeness to the general
financial centre.
Finally, Luembourg hosts, with CEDEL (Cenhale de Liv-
raison de Valeun Mobilidres) one of the two relerart clear-
ing houses in intemational bond business. CEDEL directly
profits from Luxembourg bond trading and vice-versa. In
1991 CEDEL registered a tumover of 3.336 bn US$ and
claimed a market sbue of 37o/o. Tumover shorved a remark-
able37o/o increase over 1990, br$ less than the 40% increase
enjoyed by its larger competitor, EUROCLEAR, in Brussels.
At the end of 1991, securities worth 543 bn US$ were de-
posited at CEDEL. Although not necessarily linked to, or
parallel with hading in Lu:amboug, the CEDEL tumover
might also girrc some hints on Luxernbourg Eurobond rad-
ing. Table 1.7 breaks CEDELs tumover down by cunency
and market category for 1991. It confirms the overall leading
role of US$ instuments but only due to money market in-
strum€nts and notes. Here the strare of US$ issues was 6l%.
European orrencies, with the exception of UKL, still play a
role in this field far behind the general position ofthe respec-
tirr ctrrencies. In the classical Eurobond marlcet, the situ-
ation is completely different. In this segmant, and with 70lo
still the dominant one, bonds denominated in ECU and EMS
mernber curencies are heavily traded and are the main basis
ofthe business currently done via CEDEL.
The Stock Erchange
Recent regulatory changes
The law of 21.9.90 brought some important regulatory
changes to the exchange :
* the monopoly of the exchange was abolished,
competing exchanges have become legally
possible, though economically hardly feas-
ible;
Table 1.7: Securlties T[rnover of Cedel ln 1991
Prtmarv fensacfrons Secondary transrctlons
Value (Bn USD) Share (Percentage) Value (Bn USD) Share (Percentage)
USD
AIJI)
YEN
ECU
EMS Curencles
of whlch
FRF
DEM
NLG
GBP
ITL
Others:
Other Currencles
230.1
39.9
4.5
66.9
77.3
l5.l
0.9
2.7
l9
3t.7
7.9
t4.4
53.1
9.2
I
r5.5
t7.9
3.5
0.2
0.6
4.4
7.3
1.8
3.3
790.8
78.6
t12.2
625.9
n54.2
317.7
300.5
2t6.6
137.9
89.8
9r.8
t4t.7
27.2
2.7
3.9
2t.6
39.8
10.9
10.4
't.5
4.7
3.r
3.2
4.9
Total 433.1
Source: CEDEL, own calculations
100.0 2903.3 100.0
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* supervision ofthe exchanges was assigned to
the "Commissariat aux Bourses";
I the admission of new securities for a listing
in Luxembourg has been simplified since
I .l .91;
t on March 19, l99l a law was passed which
bans insider trading.
Main ctraracteristics of the exchange
The exchange is characterised by a nrrnber offeahres
which distinguish it clearly from most other exdranges
and wtrich have not been affected by the recent regula-
tory changes :
I the listing on the exchange comprises mainly
foreign securities;
I Eurobond listings constitute the centrepiece
of the market;
r trading activity in relation to market capital-
ization is subdued, the exchange often serves
more as a quasi-official securities register
than as an active market place;
* quotes are not only in Luxembourg Francs
but also in other currencies, especially the
"home" currency of the instruments;
I new listings are possible on the basis ofthe
submission and examination of a prospectus.
In general, especially as different courtries'
respective accounting rules are accepted, ad-
mission is relatively simple and inexpensive.
The Stock Market section
Table 1.8 givCI the country distibution of listed corpor-
ations.
It strovs the dominance of foreigrr corporations, espe-
cially in terms ofmarket capitalization. This stockmar-
ket capitalization is very concentrated on a few
companies. It is dominat€d by Royal Dutch with 23%
share of the exchange's total stock market ralue.
The new admissions to the exchange in recent years
harre not changed this distibution much. The net new
listing (net oflistings and deletions) in the years 1988-
1990 comprised 5 domestic and 2l foreign companies.
Relativehadingvolume isvery dillerentto that of other
Europam stock markets. In 1990, transactions volune
for shares amounled to 3.64 bn LF& down almost 32%
from the previous year's level. Although in terms of
market capitalization domestic shares are ofminor im-
portance, they do count in terms oftrading volume; four
out ofthe five mostheavilyhadedcorporations are from
Luxembourg, including BIL and ARBED as the two
leaders.
The Bond Market section
The bondrnarket has clearly outgrown the stockmarket
involume terms inrecent decades. The volume ofbond
transactions in 1990 was 18.44 bn LFR, roughly five
times the amount of the stock turnover in the same
period. At the end of 1990, there were 7.423 bonds
liste( up from 3.245 just five years ago. Of these, 104
were domestic and7.320 Eurobonds.
Already aknost 36% of total trading volume takes place
in ECU bonds, followed by US$, CDN, AU$ and LFR
bonds which account for a share ofbetrveen 10% and
l5%. Bonds denominated in other crrrencies hardly
add to market tumover at all. ECU denominated bonds,
in particular, are increasingly important for Luxem-
bourg's exchange, for two reasons. On the one hand, the
nurnber and size of new ECU iszues is on the increase;
the volume o f new issues rose in I 990 by 35% over I 989
and is nearly 6V/oabove the corresponding 1985 level.
The main source of increase is an increasing number of
EC national government iszues, through wtrich the re-
spective govemments have tied to reduce their interest
burden and to establish a firtures market in ECU debt in-
struments in their respective counfies. On the other
han( Luxembourg's exchange has a very strong posi-
Table 1.8: Luremburg Stock Erchange
Geographlcal Orlgln of Corporatlons
wlth Share Listlng (End 1990)
Number of Share of total
Companles market
capltalizatlon (%)
Luxembourg 54 5.7
Belgium 8 7.4
Netherlands 4 33.9
Germany 6 293
France 2 6.8
Japan 45 6.1
Othprs 94 l0I
Total 100 100.0
Source: Luxembourg Stock Exchauge
Table 1.9: Luxembourg Stock Exchange
Currency Distrlbutlon of Bond Tiadlng
Turnover (7o) New Listines (70)
1990 1991 19911990
r:LUX
USD
CAD
AT]D
YEN
ECU
rr
GBP
Others
r0.3
14.9
t2.t
I1.3
2.6
29.1
4.9
5.0
9.8
9.4
t0.7
18.0
8.8
t.2
37.6
2.6
3.8
7.9
0.8 1.4
54.6 44.9
2.6 10.3
2.t t.7
10.0 8.8
t6.7 t2.9
4.0 6.5
4.2 5.4
8.1
Totel
(ln Bn FLux)
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
18.4 26.2 6209.4 6246.5
Source: Luxembourg Stock Exchauge
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tion in the ECU bond segment as, in confrast to bonds
in 'traditional" crrrencies, the "home market" as a
strong competitor is missing In 1991, not less than 73
of 90 new bonds denominated in ECU received an ex-
clusive orparallel listing in Luxembourg. Otherc€otes,
notably Paris and Londoq play a margiml role and this
only in issues by French or British issuers respectiraely.
Luxembourg therefore, has close to a monopoly on
ECUbond listingp.
Other sections
On the Luxembourg exchange three other types offin-
ancial assets are taded : warrants, UCI's (Jndertaking
for collective investmen| and gold, There are many
Japanese warranS listed and traded. But narrant trading
is very srnall, in 1990 just 0.67 bn LF& an( after the
Japanese stock market collapse in the spring and sum-
mer of 1990, this business lost orrcr 50z6 of its 1989
level.
The UCI's tumo\rer, however, is, in terms of Luxem-
bourg's stockmarketproportion, sizeable. 3.51 bn LFR
turnover could be registered inthis section during 1990,
almostthe same amountas intheshare section. Because
of the specific regulation and sire of the UCI sector in
Luxembourg, most of the UCIS listed on the exclrange
are domestic (1339 at end 1990) and only 30 from
abroad. On the gold market finally, two products are
trade4 ingots of lkg quoted in LFR and standard ban
of 400 ounces, quoted inUS$.
lvlarket Type and Reform
The marlcet is organised as an Open Olcrymarket type.
In order to strenglhen martet activities, officials are
working on a project to develop additional compu-
terized trading as in London They also nant to relax the
strictconrnissior schedule in order to atfractmore busi-
ness. These attempts are sensible and will support busi-
rrcss to some degree. Honrcrrer, giventhe structure ofthe
financial markets in Lrxembourg, it is doubtful ifl,ux-
ernboug will be able to atract much more buiness in
the future. Atbest, it shouldbeable tokeep,andperhaps
oren opand, its role as a specialised cenhe for certain
produrfs, mainly in the Etnobond market especially in
the ECU sector.
Attempts to establish a futures and options exchange in
Luxernbourg harrc also failed. The commitnent of the
banks to act as market makers had been hampered by
similarprojects in the counhies ofthe respective parent
companies, therefore leaving no room for a Luxem-
bourg market.
4. Instltutlonal Investors : Investment Funds
Slze of the lndustry
A relatively nor derrelopment is the emergence of a rr"ast and
dynarnic mutual fund or UCITS (undertaking for collective
investment in transferable securities) business. Various
funds, in different legal forms, have existed for a long time.
But it is only since the late 1980s that they have gained their
present importance on the Luxembourg financial markets.
Table l.l0 shows the rather dramatic increases in UCITS in
the last five years. In this period alone their combined net
assetralue almost quintupled. Almost the same phenomenon
can be noted in the previous 5 year time span. In the late
1980s, the arriwl of new entities (from 177 to 805) was
mainly responsible for total asset growth. In the early
Table 1.10: Development o f UCITc ln Lurcmbourg
(Undertaklngs for collectlve lnvestment ln trensferable securltles)
tn5 1980 1m5 1990 l99l
Total (1)
Number
Assets @n tr'Lux)
Average Asset Slze (Bn FLux)
FCP (2)
Number
Assets @n FLux)
Average Asset Size @n FLur)
srcAv(3)
Number
Assets @n FLux)
Averrge Asset Slze @n FLur)
97
99
l.0l
76
ll8
1.56
177
632
3.57
805
2914
3.62
889
4100
4.61
33
70
2.t3
34
75
2.2
84
360
4.28
268
t392
5.19
321
2220
6.92
4l
100
2.45
501
t425
2.84
532
1779
3.34
(I) The total number includes, besides FCP and SICAV other types of UCITs also.
(2) Fonds commuu de placemeot.
(3) Soci6t6 d'investissement i capital variable.
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1980s, both the increasing number of UCITS and average
asset size groMh contribriled to total asset growth.
The classical'talanced" fimds (bonds, strares) are the most
popular investment vehicles and have even increased their
dominance. Specialized funds (either on stocks, bonds or
real estah) loS gound with one exc€ption : money market
funds have experienced a very rapid development. The in-
creasing popularity of this kind among German investors and
the Bundesbank policy to ban this type of insfunent from
Germany have helped a lot.
The significance for the rest of the financial
sector
With the emergence of the mutual fimd business as a major
part ofthe financial services indusry in general, an import-
ant divenification and upgrading of the sector's structue
was accomplished. The diversification added to the Eurocur-
rmcy, the Eurobond and prirate client business a fourth pro-
duct line with a nrrnber of adrrantageous qualities :
the market will increase further in this decade, as private
financial wealth will grow, together with the willing-
ness to seek advice from professionals;
the market comprises the wtrole EC, therefore there is
little dependence on narow regional markets;
the mutual ftrnd sector is only weakly correlated with
the other important segments ofthe Luxemborrg finan-
cial market, therefore the overall stability of the sector
should be enhanced;
the mutual find business is high qualitybusiness, which
will, thus, increase the average quality of labour in the
financial sector, and, as the labour market is already
pretty tight, will serve as a meims to firrther increase
value added in the sector.
However, it should be noted that, although legally the cental
administration of the fi:nd has to be located in Luxembourg,
there is no resbiction on the use of outside investrnent ad-
visers who can be located anywhere. And obviously most of
the fimds rely on srrch outside support. This means that part
of the value added in this market is dispersed all over the
Westem world's major financial cenhes.
Luxembourg's main cunpetitors in this kind of business are
the Channel Islands and especially Dublin, which have com-
parably favourable regulations on investment funds. Al-
though the decisive competition pararneters are indeed these
regulations, especially taxatiorl Luxembourg can boast two
other important factors : the established overall banking sec-
tor in Luxembourg and the local exchange as a logical and
easily accessible place for a listing. Additionally, Dublins tax
breaks are limited. If they are not extended, in roughly l0
years Dublin will lose a good part of its special appeal for
mutual fund establishments.
Regulatory framework
The basic law governing muhral frmds is that of March 30,
1988. It distinguishes betrveen basic forms of funds. One dis-
tinction is between different legal forms : the.,fonds com-
muns" are special assets of a rnanagement firm, legally sep-
arated from the general assets of the firm. The frmd owners
acquire a part of this separate capital without receiving any
other ownerstrip rights than the right on the capiial and its
yields. The *SICAVs", on the other han( are organised like
closed-end funds. The investor gets full ownership rights
within the company, especially the voting rights common
stocks are classically urdowed with.
Another legal distinction is made according to the kind of in-
vestment poliry the fi:nds pursue. The fust class of fi:nds is
rather reshicted in its asset allocation; it has to diversify
rather broadly in mainly marketable securities. The second
class consists of all more specialised funds, including, as the
most important sub-category the money market firnds.
Funds of the former class, either SICAVs of FCps, can be
freely marketed in all other EC courtries, but not those in the
latter class, (they can be sold but without any advertising).
This provision, implunanting the EC directive of Decembir
20, 1985, is one of two elernents which make it attractive to
establistr zuch entities in the Grand Duchy. The relerrant mar-
ket is not Luxernbourg, but instead the whole of the EC.
Besides an initid snall constitution tax and a rather marginal
yearly tax on the net asset value, there are no other tax obli-
gations. Each frrnd has to have a depository agent, which
must be a Luxernbourg bank (either a bank under Luxem-
bourg law or under the law of another EC country and with a
place of business in Luxembourg). The duties of overall
supervision and the initiat admission lie, as with the banking
industry, with the IML.
5. fnsurance Industry
As compared to the banking sector and the securities indus-
try, insurance is rather small business in Luxernbourg. How-
ever, some change can be observed, fuelled by an important
tend on the insurance market, the rise of the ..captives".
These, legally independent, re-insurance branches of indi-
vidual corporations, have grown to more than 3,000 units
world-wide. Very specific and large corporate risks, on the
one han( and wodd-wide tax codes which favour at corpor-
ate levels the payment of insurance premiums rather than the
creation ofreserves, on the other hand, are the basis ofthis
growth industry.
Thx law provisions also lnre these captives into a few,.off-
shore" csntres. According to industry statistics, Luxembourg
is one of the favourite locations. Estimates for total premium
income of all captives in Luxembourg amount to 37 bn LFR
for the year 1990 with total assers of LFR 9l bn. Compared
to haditional insurance cenhes or to the banking sector in
Luxembourg these are, however, small. But this sector is
very dynamic (five years ago only I 2 and still in 1988 just g I
such captives were established) and serves as a kind ofdiver-
sification in the financial sector, which might lend it more
overall stability. The main countries of origin of these re-in-
surance companies are France with 27oA, Scandinavia with
25%and Belgiunwith lgYo.Tberelative absence of German
companies (iust 2 establishments) is due to German tax laws.
TheFlnenclel Sector22
Trble 1.11: Inrurrnce ComPrnlel
Metor Plecer of crPtlvel'(r)
plecer of ectebllshment (1991)
Bermudas
Cryman Islodr
Brbedos
Guoacey
Lurembourg
Isle of Man
Slngepore
Dublln
ffirlclsblatt
(.) Insurance compaoies sct up to insurc a very
specific type ofrisk, e.g. the one ofa specific
corporation
l3l9
360
200
189
140
105
46
40
tic orstomer base and to opand abroad- Most companies in
this sector have already joined forces wittr banks in order to
serve a joint client base and to overcome their problutts
stemming from their unimpressiw size.
The massiw establishnent of these captives bas led to the
settlement ofjnst a few subsidiaries ofprofessioal re-irerr'
ance companies. The finttrer developmeot in this fieldwill be
one ofthe factors cnrial fc a propo urd broader based in'
suance secttr in Luxernbotrg
Life insralrce will, after 0re opening of tbc European mar-
kets in 1993, face a tsernendors challurge to keep its domes-
6. Conclusions
Luxemboug's financial markets have developed a quite
uni+re suucture. They extribit a srrccessful combination of a
liberal framewort and of I high quality provider of spe'
cialised bar*ing services. Though large, both in absolute
terms andretative to its domesticeconomy, it is still far from
being a full rurge financial centre. It is built on just a few
products urd services, mainly in the field of euromattets,
and to some degree of prirate banking and finds services.
Ilaving atmost no domestic customer base and only a limited
domestic ba*ing industry, Luxenrborrg depurds upon its
regulatory advantages orrcr a nunber of Western countries.
But Luxembourg is also an efficient, moderale-cost, high
quality prodrcer of finalrial services. It has made some pro-
grcss in qtlarging is prodrct range and furttrer improving its
trorbct qrnlrty. This should leaw the sec-tor with rathu good
prospects in the medium t€rrn, even in an emvironment of in-
creased competitirre Pressure.
I This chaprci was mainly'prepared by P. Grasmann of the Financial engineering and capital moviments direc-
torste.
CHAPTER 2
THE MONETARY ASSOCIATION WITH BELGIUM *
1. Institutionalaspects
Several legal texts, agreedupon in different contexts, have
determined and ilhstate the partiailarities of the mmetary
situation of Lrurunbourg
The Belglan Lurembourg Economlc Unlon @I,Et)
Since 1922 Lrxembourg has formed an economic rurion with
Belgium. Within that franrework (latest full review in the
Protocol of 9 lvfarch l98l) ttrc Belgian frang as rvell as the
Luxembourg franc, has legal tender in Lrxembogrg but ttre
opposite is not tnre in Belgium. Nevertheless, the Luxem-
bourg frurc can be converted at the Natioml Bank of Bel-
giun withort costs into Belgian francs, which hasresulted in
a limited circulation of Lrxeurbourg not€s in Belgium. Lux-
ernbourg's intemational payments are denominated in Bel-
gian francs.
The circulation of Lu:rembourg francs is limited by a ceiling
on theamount ofnotes and coins thatlrurembourg can issue.
Thismaximr:m is specified as onethird oftheratio ofthe two
populations to Belgian curency in circulation. Half of the
circulation of LFRmust have as a counterpafi claims in BFR
on Belgiur residents (including the. Belgian public sector).
This resulted in a ceiling of LFR S.8r billion for 1992, which
is not completely used. Demand for Lrxembourg notes and
coins was LFR 3.5 billion in Februry 1992, about Ztr/o
(compared to a permitted one third) of total orrorcy in cir-
culation.
Lurembourg laws
The Lrurunbourg franc is at par with the Belgian franc. This
one-to-one relation was only intemrpted beetween 1935 and
l944.ln 1935, the Luxembourg artrhorities did not follow the
Belgian devaluation and at that mornent the exchange rate
was fixed at BFR 1,25 for one Lrxemborrg franc. Sirpe the
second world war the eqtrality betrveen the two currencies
has never been rmder discrssion except in 1982 wtren the
Belgian franc nas devalwd by 8.5o/o; in the event, Lrxem-
bourg decided to leave rmctranged the grand-ducal Regula-
tion of 3l lvIarch 1979 fixing the one-to-one relation.
The Benelur T[eaty
lUith respect to ttrird qrrerrcies (other ttun BFR anrl LFR)
the monetary arrangement betnreen Belgium and Luxem-
bourg makes explicit reference to the Benelux Treaty of 3
fe-!ruaryi 1958 requiring mutrul agrement on exchanfe rate
policy. This basically takes place in an EC context.
The EMUTheety
Following the deraluation of the BFR in 1982, the Luxem-
bourg Monetary Institute was set up in 1983 in order to af-
firm the monetary identity of Luxemborrg. This rvas further
enhanced by the Protocol on the Statute ofthe European
Monetary Institute @MI) and the protocol on the SAtute of
the European System ofCenhal Banks and ofthe European
Central Bank (ECB) of the Treaty, according to which the
Luembotng Monetary hstitut€ is due to become the Cen-
hal Bank of Lrurunbourg. This does not change the present
situation where the National Bank of Belgium carries out
most of the cenfd bank functions in Luerrbourg but im-
plies that Luxerrbourg will be represented on a par with the
other Member States in the futu€ En/fl urd ECB.
Trble 2.1: Outstandlng clalms and ltabiltdes tn
the lnterbank mar.het
(Oct 1991, BFR btltlon) Ctalms Ltabiltdes Net
posldon
Betglan banks
Publlc credit lnstltutlons ln D7 -50Savlngrbanks 55 92 -37
Redlscount end 5 l0 -6
Guerentee Insfitute
Lurembourgbanks 279 58 221
Othen forelgn banks 4St 2ES 166
Totel 163l 1631 0
Source: National Bank of Belgium, Annual Report,
t99l
I Issued by the Luxembourg Monetary hstitute and for a limited amount (LFR 50 mn in the form of [,FR 100 notes) by aprirate burk @anque Intemationale i Luxenrbourg).
2, A unified money and exchange market
The monetary association between the two cornries implies
a unified money market and a rnified foreip exchange mar-
ket. The special characteristics of Luxembourg make it play
an important role in both markets.
The money market
Lrxembourg banks are the largest single srpplier of funds in
the interbank market (see table 2.1). This is the courcrpart
of the large volume of BFR deposic of Belgian residents
held at Luxernbourg banks, among other, for fiscal reasons'
Due to the absence of a developed foreigr loan market for
BFR, those deposits are reinvested in the Belgian money
market.
The forelgn exchange merket
The organisation of the foreigr exclunge market is entrusted
to the Belgian-Luxe,nrbourg Exchange Institut€ (BLED' With
the abolition ofthe two-tierexchange marlcet inlvlarch 1990,
the role ofthe BLEI b@ame, however,limited to data collec-
tion. The Luxembourg authorities welcomed the end of the
dual exchange market leading to full freedom of capital
flows as this would enhance the role of Luxemborrg as a fin-
ancial cenhe.
The Luxembourg contibrtion to the rurified balance ofpay-
ments of the BI-EU can only be approximated' but it is esi-
mated to be considerable due to the presence of a large
international banking sector generating a surphs on the ser-
vice account and onthe capital accomt.
3. Monetary indicators and monetary policy
in Luxembourg
MonetarY aggregates
As a consequence of the monetary union with Belgium,
money aggregates for Luxembourg do not give mrrch infor-
mation. They reflect developrnents in the financial markets,
without clear relation with final variables like qominal GDP
growth or inflation. The rapid increase of M* over recent
]ears was not indicative of inflationary pressures building up
(see graph 2.1).
Short-term lnterest rates
The same can be said for short-term interest rates, which are
the same as in Belgitrn and reflec-t monetary conditions in
the union. Nevertheless, Luxembourg banks are tpically
more liquid than the Belgian banks, which is reflected in
somewhat lower lending rates (on mortgages, for example)
and higher deposit rales (on savings deposits, for example) as
Graph 2.1: The evolutlon of the money supply
and the rate of lnflatlon ln
Luxembourg
corrpared to equivalent Belgian rates. This can be explained
by the liberal framework including a favourable tax environ'
ment in which the banks in Luxembourg operats.
This is a phenomenon which surpasses the individual bank
and concems a whole, geographically well defined group of
burks. Although potentially there could be macro-monetary
effects, the consequ€,nces harre so far remained limited to the
micro+conornic level, only affecting competitive conditioru
s. The fact that the monetary spill-over effects in the urion
are negligible, is probably not to do with the small size of
LrxemUourg relative to Belgium. Actually, in the financial
sector, Lrxeimbourg is big relative to Belgium. The total of
the balance sheets of Luxernbourg banks amormts to BFR
12960 billion in 1990 compared to BFR 18820 billion for
Belgiurn. It is rather to be exptained by the srnall, open char-
actei of the monetary association as a wtrole. Given the ex-
change rate policy, this leads the Belgian-Luxembourg
Economic Union to import monetary conditions from Ger-
many,which lugely overstradow impulses coming froma re-
gion (in casu Luxembourg) within the union.
Inng-term lnterest retes
In contrast, long-term LFR inierest rates reflect domestic
conditions (see graph 2.2). Until 1978 the differential be-
tween long-term interest rates on public debt denominated in
LFR and BFR conesponded to the wittrholding tax' at that
time 20%, which was levied in Belgiurn and non+xistent for
Luxanbourg public debt (see graph 2.3).
In 1979, 1980 and l98l the market took also the orrency
risk into accormt as the negptive long-term interest differen'
tial widened to more than could be accounted for by the 2ry0
withholding tax By this the markets had anticipated the risk
of breaking up the one-to-one relation between the BFR and
2 M2:residents' holdings of notes and coins, sight deposits and liquidities rp to I year wi-th domestic banks. In the perspec-
tive of harmonizing at the European level monetary aggfegates, a !r9ad aggregale (M3), traced back until'1986' is also
available, including residents' foreign currency holdings at domestic banks.
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Graph 2.2 z The evolutlon of long-term lnterest
rates ln Belglum and Lurembourg
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the LFR following a devaluation of the BFR (a devaluation
that ultimately took place in February 1982).
With progress in the zubsequent adjustrnent programme for
the Belgian economy and the confirmation of the BFR/LFR
linlq the curency risk premium disappeared and the long-
term interest rate differential between the two cunencies
tended to become even smaller than what one would have
expected on the basis oftax considerations. The markets
clearly did not seem concemed about credit risk.
The reason why in 1986 and 1987 the LFR interest rate ex-
ceededthe BFRrate is not immediatelyevident brs couldbe
explained by institutional rigidities and the lack ofliquidity
in the small public LFR market which delayed what was at
that time a declining interest rate trend"
Since 1990, however, the differential has again been larger
than the Belgian wittrholding ta4 itself reduced from 25% to
l0% (see graph 2.3). This does probably not suggest a cur-
rarry risk premium, but could be an indication of the emer-
gence of a credit risk premium reflecting the fact that the
debUGDP ratio is only 3% in Luxembourg while almost
130% in Belgium.
The private LFR market has more depth and more hansac-
tions take place on it than in the public LFR market and as
srch has the advantage of containing more sigrificant infor-
matiorl A comparison with the public BFR market has, how-
ever, to take credit risk into account, which explains why the
negative differential based on the private LFR and public
BFR bond market is srnaller than the differential based on
the public LFR and public BFR market.
The narrowing of the interest rate differential towards the
end ofthe 1980s confirms the disappearance ofthe ourency
risk premium which existed at the begiruning of the decade.
In 1990, howeveq the differential remainednegative, despite
the reduction of the wittiholding tax in Belgiunr, suggesting
that credit standards (assuming absence ofcurrency risk) of
issuers in the prirate LFR market, are approaching those of
the Belgian governrnent or vice-versa.
No lndependent monetary policy
Besides the implication that monetary indicators do not say
very much about Luxembourg and seem to be more relevant
for Belgium - the larger parher in the union - the monetary
association also implies that Luxembourg does not have an
autonomous monetary policy at its disposal. It imports the
decisions of the National Bank of Belgium on wtrich its in-
fluence is limited. The Luxemboug Monetary Institute only
has the power to make use of administrative measures such
as credit ceilings or the regulation of interest rat€s. They
have, however, never been used.
4. The impact of Luxembourg as a financial
centre on the monetary policy of its
neighbours
The quantltative lmportance
As an intemational banking centre, specialized in retail btsi-
ness, Lrxembourg attracts a considerable amount of deposits
from its neighbours (see graph 2.4). Almost 80% of total de-
posits collected in 1990 by Luxembourg banks are liabilities
vis-i-vis non-residents from the non-bank sector. This repre-
sented about 6Yo of the aggregated broad money supply
(M3) of its neighbours @elgium, Germany, France and the
Netherlands). The figure of 6% overestimates the quantita-
tive importance of non-resident deposits in Luxembourg for
the money supply because of the diffculty of eliminating de-
posits coming from countries other than Luxembourg's
neighbours. However, to the extent that the geographical fac-
tor remains important in (international) retail banking, it
could nevertheless, with the necessary degree ofcaution, be
considered as a good first proxy.
Graph 2.3: The evolutlon of the long-term
lnterest rate dlfferentlal wlth the
BFR end the wlthholdlng ter
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Grrph 2.4: The lmportence of forelgn deposlts of
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Impllcrdons for monehry pollcy
Ilamronizatim of moneury aggregates at the European lwel
is based on a broad definition of morry (M3) and focusses
on the assets heldwith domestic banls bynon-financial rui-
dents. As a consequence of firuncial liberalization and inte-
gration, deposits held abroad are growing and their
sigrificance for monetary policy is potentially larger as well.
The relevant authorities arc awarg of this urd include de-
posits held abroad in an "extended'monetary aggregate
(M3e).
Germany, for example, althougb still uing M3 as the most
important aggregate, follows atso the wolutim ofMle as an
additional indicator of the monetary strnce in Germany. Ivtle
is the money stock M!, phs domestic non-bank deposits
wittr domestic banks' foreign branches and foreigr subsi-
diaries, and bearer bonds in the hands ofdomestic non-
banks. Since 1975 the average grourth rate of M3e has
usrally been higher tban M3 (see graph 2.5). The largest dif-
ference was obserrrcd in 1989, probably to be erylained by
the introduction of a wittrholding tax in Germany. Although
not the wtrole of the difference betwem M3e and M3 is ex-
plained by international portfolio diversificatioq a large part
can be attributedto it.
The steady increase of liabilities of Luxenrbourg banls vis4-
vis non-bank non-residents relative to the money supply of
Greph 2.5: The growth of M3 end M3E ln
Germrny slnce 1975
its neighboun, u&ile the relation between those liabilities
and total liabilities of Lu:rembourg banls vis-A-vis the non-
bank sector sefir to be less stable, suggests tentatively that
the motive for holding deposits abroad finds its origin in the
desire of domestic residents (i.e. rcsidents of countries other
than Lu:renrbourg) to diversiS their portfolio, to which Lnx-
embourg reacted more or less passively. The hypothesis is
that a more adirre role of Luxembourg in atracting foreigt
deposits would be reflected in a steady irprease of the sture
of foreip deposits to total deposits ofluxembourg; this was
not obsenrcd during the 1980's.
The growing importance of offshore deposits in Luxem-
bourg and other financial centes raises the qr-restion how to
accormt for them in the desigrr of monetary policy. One
possibility is to redeFrne monetary aggregates and include
the offshore deposits ofresidents in order to stengthen the
relation between the money srpply and nominal variables. In
additioq dornestic poliry makers could look to more indica-
tors like interest rates, exchange rates and the yield curve,
than e:rclusively concentat€ on the evolution of the money
supply. This does not mean that money aggregat€s became
superfluous as an indicator ofmonetary conditions; eqpecial-
ly at the European level, as a corsequence of economic and
financial integratiorl an increasingly stable relation might be
found between money aggregates and nominal develop-
ments.
. This chapter was mainly prepared by F. Keereman of the Monetary matters directorate.
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Teble 1: Main Economlc Indlcators 1961-93 f)
Luxembourg (annual percentage change, unless otherwlse stated)
196l-73 1974-84 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 l99l 1992 1993
l. Gross Domestic Product
-at current prices
-at constant prices
2. GDPperHead ofPopulation
-at current prices
3. Gross Fixed Capital Formation at
Constant Prices
-total
{onstruction
+quipment
4. Gross Fixed Capital Formation at
Current Prices (% of GDP)
-total
-general govemment
-other sectors
5. Final National Uses incl. Stocks
-at constant prices
6. lnflation
-price deflator private consumption
-price deflator GDP
7. Compensation per Employee
-nominal
-real, defl ator private consumption
-real, deflator GDP
8. GDP at Constant lvlarket Prices
per Person Employed
9. Real Unit Labour Costs
-1961-73 = 100
-annual o/oclvnge
10. Employment
ll. UnemploymentRate
(% ofcivilian labour force)
12. Cunent Baiance (% of GDP)
13. Net Lending (+) orNet Bonowing o
of General Govemment (% of GDP)
14. Gross Debt of General Government
(% oF GDP)
15. Interest Payments by Gmeral
Government (% OF GDP)
16. Long Term lnterest Rate (70)
4.9
:
26.4
:
8.7
4.0
3.2
4.0
3.0
4.4
7.4
4.2
2.8
3.0
r00.0
-.2
l.l
6.8
2.0
I15.9
1.3
.4
1.6
8.8 6.0 8.8 1.9 10.0 13.0 6.2 6.1 4.5 6.2
t.7 2.9 4.8 2.9 5.7 6.7 3.2 3.1 2.2 2.0
1.3 2.7 4.3 2.3 4.8 5.6 2.0 1.9 2.4 ;l
-2.t -9.5 31.2 t4.7 l4.t 8.9 2.5 9.8 4.5 2.3
-3.1 -2.1 5.7 8.9 8.8 4.6 8.0 7.1, 6.0 3.3
-.8 -20.5 87.2 18.7 t6.r -t6.9 10.9 ll.4 3.5 t.7
24.5 t1:t 22.t 25.5 27.0 27.1 26.9 29.0 29.7 29.6
6.2 4.6 4.3 4.9 5.0 4.8 4.7 4.4 4.5 4.7
18.3 l3.l 17.8 20.7 22.0 22.3 22.2 24.6 25.2 24.9
1.6 .l 8.0 4.2 6.8 5.7 5.1 8.4 3.3 2.2
7.7 4.3 1.3 1.7 2.7 3.6
7.0 3.0 3.8 -1.0 4.0 6.0
3.6
2.9
2.9 3.4 4.7
3.0 2.2 4.1
9.7 4.2 3.6 4.8 3.1 6.7 6.9 5.4 5.1 6.0
1.8 .0 2-3 3.1 .4 3.0 3.2 2.4 1.6 1.2
2.5 1.2 -.2 5.9 -.9 .7 3.9 2.3 2.8 1.8
1.2 1.5 2.1 .l 2.6 2.9 -l.l -.6 .7 .5
25.3 43.8 38.8 30.3 30.8 34.0
1.4 6.2 4.3 2.4 3.1 5.3
108.6 106.2 112.2 108.4 106.1
-.3 -2.3 5.7 -3.4 -2.1
t.4 2.6 2.8 3.1 3.7
2.9 2.6 2.5 2.0 r.8
1r1.4 114.7 l17.l 118.6
5.0 2.9 2.1 1.3
4.3 3.6 1.5 1.5
1.7 1.6 1.9 2.0
34.2 27.9 19.9 18.7
5.0 -.8 -.4 -1.0
r5.4 14.0 13.5 ll.9 9.8 8.3 6.9 6.1 6.8 7.8
1.2 l.t
8.0 9.5
l.l t.2 1.0
8.7 8.0 7.1
.6 .6 .5 .5
8.6 8.2 7.9 :
.7
7.7
l) t96l-91: EUROSTAT and COMMISSION SERVICES; 1992-93 Economic Forecasts January 1993
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Tablc 2: Grcsc Domestlc koduct: GDP end ltr Demand Components et Conrtent Merket Hces (l)(7o chrnge over prevlous year)
982 t 1989 r I t992t
Private consrmption
hrblic consrrnption
Gross fixed capital fomration
ofwhich:
2.E r.7 .4 .5 t.4 2.7 3.4 5.0 3.9 3.9 4.0 6.5 3.1 2.23.1 t.4 1.5 1.9 2.2 2.0 3.1 2.7 3.8 1.9 3.2 3.8 2.2 2.3
t2.7 :t.4 -.5 -11.8 .l -9.5 3t.2 t4.7 t4.t 8.9 2.5 9.8 4.5 2.123.9-t5.5 .2 4.9 2.7 -20.5 87.2 18.7 16.l _16.9 t0.9 ll.4 3.5 t.77.2 -3.0 -2.3 -t3.3 -3.7 -2.t 5.7 E.9 8.8 4.6 8.0 7.t 6.0 3.3
-2.9 -1.0 -.2 t.4 2.5 2.6 2.1 -.4 .l .9 2.4 3.9 3.5 3.55.4 t.2 l.l -.6 2.5 .l 8.0 4.2 6.8 5.7 5.1 8.4 3.3 2.2
-1.4 4.8 -.3 5.3 18.0 9.5 3.2 6.3 7.5 6.9 2.6 3.5 l.l 1.3
3.2 -2.9 -.3 t.2 t3.9 7.0 6.0 7.6 8.5 6.1 4.3 8.3 2.t 1.5
.8 -.6 l.l 3.0 6.2 2.9 4.8 2.9 s.7 6.7 3.2 3.1 2.2 2.0
eEripment
constructim
Slockbuilding (as % of GDP)
Total domestic demand
E:Eorts ofgoods and services
hports ofgoods and services
GDP
1992-93: Commi$is, Forecasts Jauuary 1993
SOURCE: COMMISSION SERVICES
Table 3: Dlsposable Income, Consumptlon rnd Savtng of Eousehotds (et current prlces)
1990: As % of
disposable income
Lrxembourg: (% cbanges)
Compersation of emplopes
Non labour income, net
Orrrent transfers received
Direct taxes and cunent tansfers paid
Gross diqposable incsne
R€al
Consunption
Real
Household saving
Consumer price deflator
Hotrsehold saving ratio
7.2 6.4 8.3
-2.6 -8.8 7.E
6.7 4.1 6.0
3.9 s.7 4.8
6.7 3.2 9.0
5.1 .4 5.5
7.2 6.6 7.3
5.6 3.7 3.8
4.t -17.2 22.5
1.5 2.8 3.3
14.0 I1.3 t2.7
9.1 7.6 5.0 7.3
5.7 5.5 6.0 5.06.2 8.3 5.6 7.56.4 :7.2 6.8 6.38.7 t4.2 4.7 7.45.4 9.9 1.3 2.6
7.7 10.6 6.6 7.0
4.3 6.5 3.1 2.2
16.0 16.9 -5.1 9.83.2 3.9 3.4 4.7
13.5 t6.2 14.7 15.0
92.t
t4.5
38.3
44.8
100.0
73.8
35.9
28.8
38.5
100.0
86.5 86.5
13.5 13.7
t992-93:
SOURCE:
Commission Forecasts January 1993
COMMISSION SERVICES
Table 4: Waga, Producfrvlty rnd Tenms of ftade (% change over prevlous year)
986 l
3.6 4.8
1.3 1.7
2.3 3.1
5.6 1.5 2.t .l 2.6 2.9 -r.r -.6 .7 .5
I
5.1 6.0
3.4 4.7
1.6 t.2
t99
5.4
2.9
2.4
Nominal nages per e,rrployee
Private consumption prices
Real uages
(prira.oonsrrnpti on prices)
Produciivity
(real GDP/person employed)
Unit labour costs, whole economy
Tenns oftade
(goods and services)
Adjtsted uage share
3.1 6.7
2.7 3.6
.4 3.0
7.t 4.2
6.5 4.3
.5 .0
9.0
7.5
1.4
.l
8.5 6.9 6.9
8.6 10.6 8.3
-.1. -3.3 -t.2
-.9 t.4 3.3
6.9
3.6
3.2
2.7 r.5 4.6 .5 3.7
.8 2.3 4.0 t.2 2.2
8.9 9.4
-.3 -.4
5.5 3.5 r.5
1.5 -1.9 -2.0
8.1 6.0 4.3 5.5
-.8 -1.2 -1.5 -.3
.6 1.5 -3.6 -2.2 -2.0 -.2 -t.5 3.8 -2.4 -r.4 3.3 2.0 1.5 .s
Forecasts January 1993
SteficdcrlAnner30
Teblc 5: Geognphlcrl DlsHbudon of Erternrl Tled e (tt '/o of totd)
IMPORTS
Eur-12
Ofwhich:
u.s.A.
Japan
Ottprs
TOTAL
As % ofGDP
90.0
Belgitm 35.5
Germmy 35.2
Nethertands 2.9
Frarce 12.5
Italy 2.2
United-Kingdom 1.5
4.9
.l
5.0
90.9
19.6
30.3
4.6
I1.3
2.1
2.0
3.0
.5
5.6
91.5
t7.7
30.7
5.1
12.2
2.4
2.2
2.2
.6
5.7
91.0
37.2
31.1
4.6
t2.2
2.3
2.4
3.3
.5
5.2
91.8
37.5
32.9
4.5
I1.5
2.1
2.0
2.1
.7
5.4
9l.l
37.2
32.1
5.1
l1.6
2.2
1.5
2.0
.8
5.1
92.3 90.5
39.0 38.731.0 29.9
4.3 4.4
t2.4 l2.l
2.0 2.1
2.0 1.6
1.6 1.9
.8 1.9
5.3 5.7
100.0
79.5
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
90.9 80.4 85.8 86.4 86.6 85.0 87.4
EXPORTS
Eur-I2
Of wttich:
U.S.A.
Japan
Others
TOTAL
As % ofGDP
78.1
Belgiun 17.9
Gerruny
Netherlands
Frarrce
Itrly
28.6
6.9
15.4
3.5
74.5
l7.l
26.5
6.1
13.5
3.6
4.8
5.5
.l
19.9
79.3
16.7
29.t
6.1
15.3
4.4
4.6
5.2
.2
15.3
80.5
16.5
28.6
5.8
16.3
4.9
5.3
5.2
.4
r3.9
81.0
17.9
n.2
5.6
t6.4
4.6
6.0
4.E
.5
13.7
79.5
16.6
26.0
5.5
17.0
4.5
6.5
4.7
1.0
r4.8
80.8 82.616.3 17.3
27.7 29.6
5.8 5.1
t7.t 17.3
43 4.2
5.6 5.24.0 3.1
1.1 .7
l4.l 13.6
United-Kingdom 3.6
3'4
,2
lE.3
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
66.t 81.9 74.4 7t.7 75.4 75.6 7t.t 68.5
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Teble 6: Labour Market Indlcaton
1960 lyl0 1980 1985 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 r99l 1992 le93
l. Population (1000)
2. Population, l5-6a years (1000)3. idern,asa%oftotalpopulation
4. t abour force, as a % ofpopul. l5-6a y.(l)
5. Employment (1000)
l. ofwtrich:
residents of Lu:c nationality
residen$ of for. nationality
non residents
2. ofwhich:
steel
other marufartures
finmcial services
other senrices
other
6. Employmenf as a % of tot. popul.
7. Self+mployed (1000)8. id., as a % oftotal employrrent
9. Wage and salaryeamers (1000)
10. id., as a % oftotal employnert
ll. Part-timeworkers
I 2. Ununployment rate (2)
313.5 339.2 364.4 366.7 368.4 370.8 373.91n.7 382.0 386.2 385.3 390.3
213.t 221.t u6.5 255.2 256.9 258.7 262.3 265.7 267.9 269.6 256.3 257.8
68.0 65.4 CI.6 69.6 69.7 69.8 70.1 70.4 70.r 69.8 66.5 6.t
:63.3 65.8 64.8 65.8 67.1 67.9 69.3 7r.6 73.7 78.8 79.7
t32.0 t40.2158.2 160.9 165.t 169.7 174.9 181.3 189.1 196.0 198.9 201.9
107.1 106.3
25.7 40.0
7.4 11.9
105.9 106.4 106.0 105.5 t05.1 106.8 106.0 : :
38.1 39.6 41.5 43.8 46.t 48.3 49.2 : :
16.9 l9.l 22.2 25.6 30.1 34.0 37.5 : :
23.5
23.1
4.3
60.9
28.4
41.3
27.6
t9.7
n2.6
80.3
8.1
18.7
t7.7 13.l
24.4 25.6
8.1 10.8
81.5 89.0
26.5 22.4
43.4 43.9
2t.2 18.8
13.4 n.7
t37.0 t42.t
86.6 88.3
13.0 t2.t
26.4 26.7
I1.9 13.3
91.2 94.1
22.6 23.5
44.8 45.8
18.5 18.3
n.2 r0.8
146.6 t5t.4
88.8 89.2
: 6.52.6 2.5
51.6 st.i
17.8 t7.7
9.0 8.8
l8t.l 184.2
91.0 91.2
10.6 t0.2 9.5 8.9 8.5
26.8 n.2 28.0 28.0 :
t4.4 15.8 t7.t t7.9 r8.3
98.5 103.3 108.8 : :
42.t
37.8
28.6
94.2
7t.4
: 1.9 2.0.0 2.4 2.9
24.6 U.8 25.7 :
46.8 48.0 49.5 50.8
18.0 17.9 17.7 18.0
r0.3 9.9 9.4 9.2
t56.9 t63.4 t71.4 178.0
89.7 90.1 90.6 90.86.8 7.t 7.3 7.82.0 1.8 t.7 t.6
(l) Including non-residents from surrounding regions in Belgium, France and Germany
(2) Number of unemployed as ao/t of civilian resident labour force, Eurostat delinition
SOURCE: STATEC and COMMISSION SERVICES
Table 7: Government Net Borrowlng (-) or Net Lendlng (+) .nd Gross Debt
est'/o of GDP
Govemment net bonowing O or net lending (+)
Including interest paym€nts Excluding interest payrrcnts Gross debt
t970
t97t
t972
t973
t974
t975
1976
t977
1.2
2.6
2.3
3.8
5.3l.l
2.0
3.3
5.0
.7
-.8
-3.9
-1.6
1.5
2.8
6.2
4.3
2.4
3.1
5.3
5.0
-.8
-.4
-1.0
,2
-.7
-t.6
-t.2
-2.2
4.9
-3.7
-3.0
-3.9
-3.6
-3.8
-5.2
-5.4
-5.2
-5.1
-5.0
4.6
-3.9
-3.4
-2.6
-3.9
4.5
-5.3
-5.7
4.3
3.7
3.4
4.8
6.1
2.0
2.8
4.2
6.0
1.6
.5
-2.5
.0
3.1
4.5
7.4
5.3
3.5
4.0
6.1
5.6
-.2
.2
-.5
2.t
t.2
.3
.7
-.1
-2.6
-1.2
.,4
-l.l
.,7
-.6
-1.5
-1.3
-.8
-.4
-.1
.4
.7
t.2
2.t
.9
.4
.0
-.1
?3.t
28.2
25.1
n.4
16.6
l8.l
t6.4
t6.6
15.4
t4.2
13.8
14.4
r4.5
14.8
15.0
14.0
13.5
I1.9
9.8
8.3
6.9
6.1
6.8
7.8
4t.4
40.9
42.4
42.8
43.t
43.4
45.6
50.4
53.3
56.3
58.8
59.7
61.0
60.1
59.3
59.0
60.9
63.6
61.2
40.9
40.5
4t.9
42.5
42.9
43.t
45.4
50.2
53.2
56.3
59.0
59.9
6r.3
60.6
59.9
59.7
61.6
44.2
6t.8
978
979
980
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
-5.3
-5.5
-5.3
-5.3
-5.2
4.8
4.t
-3.6
-2.8
4.t
4.7
-5.4
-5.8
-1.6
-1.4
-.8
-.6
-.2
.3
.7l.l
1.9
.8
.4
.0
.l
l=L; 2=EUR-10=EUR-12 excl. GR P; 3=EUR-12
1992-93: Commission Forecasts Janury 1993
SOURCE: COMI\,IISSION SERVICES
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No. I The Federal Republic of Germaoy (September 1990)
No.2 Portugal ( February l99l)
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No. l0
No. ll
Economic Papers*
l.tllt]"qy-i'g papers have been issued. copies may be obtained by apptying to the address mcntioned on the insideitont cover.
No' I EEC-DG II inflationary expectations. S-u.rvey based inflationary expectations for the EEC countries,by F. Papadia aud V. Basano (May lgSl).
No' 3 A review of the informal economy in the European Community, by Artrian Smith (July lgEl).
No' 4 Problems of interdependence in a multipolar world, by Tommaso Padoa-schioppa (August lgEl).
No. 5 European Dimensions in the Adjushent Problems, by Michael Emerson (August tggl).
No. 6 The bilateral kade li lagcs of the f,urslink Model : An analysis of foreign hada and competitiveness, byP. Ranuzzi (January 1982).
No. 7 Piiif*H#if;#.*J?r!"f economic trends and problems, by D. Adams, S. Gi[espie, M. Green and
No' E of en est la thEorie macro6conomique, par E. Malinvaud (uin l9g2).
No' 9 Y.Tgr,rfl EqPloYmcnt Subsidies : An Effective Policy to Generate Employment, by Carl Chiarella audAlfred Steinherr (November l9g2).
The Great Dcpression : A Repeat in the 1980s ?, by Alfred steinherr (November l9g2).
i:ii*ili,";ffill:a:ii"B,TH%: $""1#,i3?fr1:,'$t'iidaise, par D'c' Breedverd, c. Depoortere,
Y,fi i::bTlHT,,r:",ifi tr"hit*,g?:'iffi ,!T'B:*HXr,i:",,"u,fr #il#aryili,,Ttfi?,piiiii
The supply of output equations in the BC-countries and the use of ttre survey-based inflationaryexpectations, by Paul De Grauwe and Mustapha Nabli (tr,tay iSg3).-- -
Structural trends of financial systems and capital accumulation : France, Germany, Italy, by G. Nardozzi(May 1983).
Monetary assets andinflatioa induced distorsions ofthe national accounts - conceptual issues andcorrection of sectoral income flows in 5 EEC counhiei, ty etiiCuliJr-"n ioa-l-Jigei ir,f-oriias"n(May 1e83).
Federal Reoublic of Germruy. Mediu-n-term economic trends and problems, by F. Allgayer,S. Gillespi6, M. Green ana l{. *ortmani-(l*iis8il. Bvrg' qs Prvv
The employment miracle in the US and stagpation employment in the EC, by M. Wegper (Iuly l9E3).
Productive Performance in lVest German Manufacturing Industry l920-1980; A Farrell FrontierCharacterisation, by D. Todd (August 1983).
ff'd:ts-3,i3f"'"ili:'#,t*"uff#ffit 1if,?,:,Tffi***'iriiPf,,lcits : A cross-countrv comparison,
No. 20 Monetary assets and inflation induced distortions of the national accounts. The case of Belgium, byKen Lennan (October 1983).
No. l2
No. l3
No. 14
No. 15
No. 16
No. 19
No. 17
No. 18
* 
"Economic Papers'arc written by the Staff of thJ Directorate-Geoeral for Economic aad I
*,-u$$e;$r**.;.,$#,=1:;tfl 31,.*;,$
:l[::Blit,*ith those of fte Cbmmissiori of tue ruiopeai'ComfoiliiiA Co;;"o6-;;";ri;i;;r'il;;itlia
The Directorate-General for Bconomic and Financial Affairs,Commission of the European Co--rmitiii,
200, rue de la Loi
1049 Brussels, Belgium
No. 2l Actifs financiers et distorsions des flux sectoriels dues A I'inflation : le cas de la France, par J.-P. Bach6(octobre 1983).
No. 22 f&ri:ttl,##:t$:"r6Trffi"HIt"ffi#r,5iii.'rroi 
: res subventions i ra creation d'emprois'
No. 23 Income Distribution aad Employment in the European Communities 1960-1982, by A- Steinherr(December 1983).
No. 24 U.S. Deficits, the dollar and Europe, by O. Blanchard and R. Dornbusch (December 1983).
No. 25 Monetary Assets and inflation induced distortions of the national accouuts. The casc of the Federal
i{"poUiii oi 6ermany, by H. Wittelsberger (Ianuary 1984)'
No. 26 Actifs finaucicrs et distorsions des flux sectoriels dues I I'inflation : le cas de I'Italie, par A. Reati(anvier 1984).
No. 27 Evolution et probllmes structurels de l'6conomio italienne, par Q. Ciardelli, F. Colasanti et X. Lannes(aovier 1984). 
i
No. 28 International Co-operation in Macro-economib Policies, by J.E. Meade (February l9M).
No. 2g The Growth of public Expe,nditure in the EEc Countries 1960-1981 : Some Reflections, by Douglas
Todd (December l9E3).
No. 30 The integration of EEC qualitative c_onsumJr-survey.r^TYlts in econometric modelling : atr application to
the coaslmption function, by Peter Praet (February l9E4)'
No. 3r Report of the cEPS Macroec-onomi"'d'ifi1ro,ii,:l'*yil$Hffi:f?fr11i i6i6:*"on growth'by}. LaYard, G. Bascvi, O. Blanchar
No. 32 Total Factor Pro6uctivity Growth and-t{e-Productivity Slowdown in the West Germau Industrial Sector,
iiZo-iset, by Douglas todd (April 1984).
No. 33 An analytical Formulatioa and Bvaluation of th9 E:isting Slruclure of Ljgal Reserve Requirements of
the Greek gcononyl Ar Uncommon Case, by G. Demopoulos (June l9M).
No. 34 Factor productivity Growth in Four EEC Countries, 1960-1981, by Douglas Todd (October 1984)'
I
No. 35 Rate of profit, business cycles and capital accuddation in U.K. industry, 1959-1981, by Angelo Reati(November 1984).
No 36 HiH:s[ffr:'J,'#ff,ffi:ts"1iil3J[:"ojl]X;,tr8iJH"fjf:fl"91?x,hf,l:il3:,itfi:i-x'1i:"'
No. 37 Schemas for the construction of an "auxiliary econometric model' for the social security system,
by A. Coppini and G. Laina (June 1985).
No. 3g Seasonal an6 Cyclical Variations in Relationqhjp:amoqg Expec-tations, Plans and Realizations in
Susin"ss TesiSurveys , by H. K6nig and M' NCrlove (July 1985)'
No. 39 Analysis of the stabilisation mechanisms of macroeconomic models : a comparison of the Eurolink
noO6ts by A. Bucher and V. Rossi (July 1985).
No. 40 Rate of profit, busioess cycles and capital accumulation in West German industry, 1960-1981, by
A. Reati(JulY 1985). 
i
No. 4l Inflation iuduced redistributions via monelary._assets in fiv^eturopeau couutries : 1974'1982,
irA:-aniittmao, K. Lennan and F. Papadia (Septehnber 1985)'
No.42 lvork Sharing : why ? How ? How not ..., by Jacques H. Drlze (December 1985).
No. 43 Toward Understanding Major Fluctuations of the Dollar by P. Armington (January 1986).
No. 44 predictive valuo of firms' manpower expectations aiA poticy implications, by G. Nerb (March 1986)'
I
No. 45 Le taux de profit et ses composantes dans I'industrie frangaise de 1959 e 1981, par Angelo Reati(Mars 1986).
No. 46 5:f"?*ilf ,ffiS",r3v *Xt5:ff,_L"itrf"Xit:BHtitirTI,"Iro 
the rour main EC-countries - Expe-
No' 47 UBL*,"$,'*'"ilfi1:?:",tlt'tl*,':il{:[i]f;,1:$191: H:H3'1""ffiiTil fxi:ff ifrff,1t's):'
Economh Prperr
No. 48 Evo^luti-onct probllmes structurels dc l'6sonomio frangaiso, par X. Lannes, B. Philippe et P. Lenain(ao0t 1986).
No. 49 Long nrn implicationr of tho incrcaso in-taxation and public debt for employment and economic
growth ia Europc by G. Tullio (August l9E6).
No. 50 Consumers Bxpectations and Aggregato Personal Savtngr by Daaiel Weiserbs and Peter Simmons(November 1986).
No. 5l Do after tax interest affect_pr_ivate consumption aod savings ? Empirical evidence for 8 industrial
countries : 1970-1983 by G. Tullio and Fr. Contesso @ecember l-986).
No. 52 Validity and llmits of applied exchangc rate models : a brief survey of some recent contributions
by G. t'ulio lnecemUeilSSOl.
No. 53 Monetary aud Exchaogc Ratc Policier for International Financial Stability : a Proposal by
Ronald f. McKinnon ltrIovember t9C6).
No. 54 Internal and External Libcralisation for Faster Growth by Herbert Giersch (February 1987).
No. 55 Regulation or Deregulation of the Labour Market : Policy Regimes for the Recruitment and Dismissal of
Employees in the Industrialised Counhies by Michael Emersoh (June 1987).
No. 56 Causes of the developme,nt of tho privato ECU and the behaviour of its interest rates :
October 1982 - September 1985 by G. Tullio and Fr. Contesso (July 1987).
No. 57 Capital/Labour substitution and its impact on employment by Fabienne llzkovitz (September 1987).
No. 58 The Dcterminants of the German Official Discount Rato and of Liquidity Ratios during the classical
goldstandarrt : 1876-1913 by Andrea Sommariva and Giuseppe Tullio (September 1987).
No. 59 Profitability, real iaterest rates aud fiscal crowding out in the OECD area 1960-1985 (An examination of
the crowding out hypothesis within a portfolio model) by Jorgen Mortcnsen (October 1987).
No. 60 The two-handed growth slategy for Europc : Autonomy through flexible cooperation by J. Dr0ze,
Ch. Wyplosz, Ch. Bean, Fr. Giavazzi and H. Gicrsch (October l9E7).
No. 6l Collusive Behaviour, R & D, and European Policy by Alcxis Jacqucrnin (November 1987).
No. 62 Inflation adjusted governmeot budget deficits and their impact on the business cycle : empiricat
evidence for E industrial countries by G. Tullio (November 1987).
No. 63 Monetary Policy Coordination Within the EMS : Is There a Rule ? by M. Russo and G. Tullio(April lt88).
No. 64 Le Ddcouplage de la Finance et de I'Economie - Conhibution I I'Evaluation des Enjeux Europ6ens
dans la R6volution du Systlme Financier Intcrnational par J.-Y. Haberer (Mai 1988).
No. 65 The completion of the hternal market: results of macroeconomic model simulations by M. Catinat,
E. Donni and A. Italianer (September 1988).
No. 66 Europe after the crash : economic policy in an cra of adjustment by Charles Bean (September 1988).
No.67 A Survey of the Economies of Scale by CliffPratten (October 1988).
No. 68 Economies of Scale and Intra-Community trade by Joachim Schwalbach (October 1988).
No. 69 Economies of Scale and the Integration of the European Economy : the Case of Italy by Rodolfo Helg
and Pippo Ranci (October 1988).
No. 70 The Costs of Non-Europe - An assessment bascd on a formal Model of Imperfect Competition and
Economies of Scale by A. Snith and A. Venables (October 1988).
No. 7l Competitioa and Innovation by P.A. Geroski (October 1988).
No. 72 Commerce lntra-Branche - Performances des firmes et analyse des Echanges commerciaux dans la
Communaut6 europ6enne par le Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales de Paris(octobre 1988).
No. 73 Partial Equilibrium Calculatious of the Impact of Interaal Market Barrierc in the European Community
by Richard Cawley and Michael Daverport (October 1988).
No. 74 The exchange-rate question in Europe by Francesco Giavazzi (January 1989).
35
No. 75 Tho QUEST model (Version 1988) by Peter Bekx, Anne Bucher, Alexander Italianer, Matthias Mors(March 1989).
No. 76 Europe's Prospects for the 1990s by Herbert Giersch (May 1989).
No. 77 1992, Hypc or Hope : A review by Alexander Italianer (February 1990).
No. 78 European labour markets : a long ruq view (ClP-S_Mqcroeconognic Polic-y- Group 1989 Annual Report)
by J.:P. Danthine, Ch. Bean, P. Bernholz and E. Malinvaud (February 1990).
No. ?9 Country Studler - The United Kingdom by Tassos Belessiotis and Ralph \Vilkinson (July 1990).
No. 80 See (Llnderrtudlen'No. I
No. 8l Country Studler - The Netherlands by Filip Keereman, Frangoise Moreau and Cyriel Vaubelle(July 1990).
No. 82 CounEy Studler - Belgium by Johan Baras, Filip Keereman and Frangoise Moreau (July 1990).
No. 83 Completion of the internal market : An application of Public Choicc Theory by Manfred Teutemann(Audust 1990).
No. 84 Monetary aud Fiscal Rules for Publio Debt Sustainability by Marco Buti (September 1990).
No. 85 Are we at the beginning ofa new long term expansion induced by technological change?,
by Angelo Reati (August l99l).
No. 86 Labour Mobility, Fiscal Solirlarity and the Exchange Rate Regime: a Parable of European Union and
Cohesion, by Jorge Braga de Macedo (October l99l).
No. 87 The Economics of Policies to Stabilize or Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions: the Case of CO2,
by Mathias Mors (October l99l).
No. 88 The Adequacy and Allocation of World Savings, by Javier Santillin @ecember l99l).
No. 89 Microeconomics of Saving, by Barbara Kauffmann (Deceuiber l99l).
No. 90 Exchange Rate Policy for Eastern Europe and a Peg to the ECU, by Michael Davenport (March 1992).
No. 9l The German Economy after Unification: Domestic and European Aspects, by Jiirgen Kr6ger and
Manfred Tcutemann (April 1992).
No. 92 Lessons from Stabilisation Programmes of Central and Eastern European Countries, l9E9-91'
by Domenico Mario Nuti (May 1992).
No. 93 Post-Soviet Issues: Stabilisation, Trade and Money, by D. Mario Nuti aod Iean Pisani-Ferry (May 1992).
No. 94 Regional Integration in Europe, by Andr6 Sapir (September 1992).
No. 95 Hungary : Towards a Market Economy (October 1992).
No. 96 Budgeting Procedures aad Fiscal Performance in the Europem Commrmities, by lihge'n von Hagen (October 1992).
No. 97 L'ECU en poche? Quelques rEflexions sur la m6thode et le co{lt du re,mptaceme,lrt des momaies manuelles nationales
par des pilirs et dei bil-ets eo ECU, par Ephraim Marquer (octobre 1992).
No. 98 The Role of tbe Banking Sector in the Process of Privatisation, by Domenico Mario Nuti (November 1992).
No. 99 Towards budget discipline: an economic assessme,nt oflhe po_ssibilitie_s forleducin_g rylioqel deficits in the run-up
to EMU, by Dr. J. ae Haan" Dr. C.G.M. Sterts and Prof. Dr. C.A. do Kam @ecember 1992).
No. 100 EC Enlargement and thc EFTA Cormtieg by Christopher Sardelis (March 1993).
No. l0l Agriculture in the Uruguay Round: ambitions and realities, by H. Guyomard, L-P.Mah6, K. MuDk and T. Roe(March 1993).


